The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions by Berman, Emily
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 4 Article 6 
2013 
The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions 
Emily Berman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1777 (2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 








Since 9/11, legislators and commentators alike have hailed expiration 
dates—or “sunset provisions”—as a means to moderate the government’s 
tendency to curtail individual freedoms in response to security crises.  
Sunsets advocates explain that such provisions provide Congress with an 
opportunity to reevaluate counterterrorism legislation after the crisis 
atmosphere has passed, enabling legislators to adjust any policy whose 
infringement on civil liberties appears, in retrospect, unjustified by its 
benefits. 
This Article demonstrates that, rather than guarding against the long-
term entrenchment of overly robust security measures, sunsets have the 
opposite effect.  The Article begins by illustrating that Congress’s high 
expectations for counterterrorism sunsets have not been borne out by their 
impact.  It then explains that the failure of sunsets to prompt meaningful 
reevaluation of post-crisis counterterrorism measures stems from two 
sources.  First, optimism over sunsets’ potential relies on several 
inaccurate assumptions about how the state of the world will change 
between the time a statute is enacted and its sunset date.  And second, this 
optimism fails to account for the President’s outsized role in 
counterterrorism policymaking.  Finally, the Article identifies sunsets’ 
hidden cost:  paradoxically, by insisting on including sunset provisions, 
legislators concerned about overzealous counterterrorism legislation 
actually facilitate the enactment of such statutes.  And as sunsets do not 
subsequently correct overzealous policy, they enable the long-term 
entrenchment of the very policymaking errors they are designed to prevent.  
The Article concludes that citizens and legislators concerned about the civil 
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liberties costs of counterterrorism policy should reject claims that sunsets 
are an effective answer to those concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[N]o man ever legislates at all.  Accidents and calamities occur in a 
thousand different ways, and it is they that are the universal legislators of 
the world.”1 
While the eyes of the world were focused on negotiations over the “fiscal 
cliff” and its possible impacts on tax rates, federal programs, and the 
 
 1. See OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:  EMERGENCY 
POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 68 (2006) (quoting PLATO, THE LAWS 164 (Trevor J. 
Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970)). 
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economy more broadly, another deadline came and went practically 
unnoticed.  On December 31, 2012, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 20082 (FAA)—the statute that codified the 
controversial Bush Administration program allowing warrantless 
wiretapping of Americans’ communications known as the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program—was scheduled to expire.3  Until, that is, Congress 
passed an eleventh-hour five-year extension of the statute.4  While 
Congress is notoriously gridlocked on issues ranging from the economy to 
the environment to entitlement reform, this statute was renewed by a 
bipartisan majority with little public debate and no modifications.5 
The expiration date—or “sunset provision”—grew out of the 
circumstances surrounding the legislation’s initial enactment.  President 
George W. Bush implemented his Terrorist Surveillance Program in secret 
and without statutory authorization in the immediate wake of 9/11.6  The 
New York Times revealed the program’s existence in 2005,7 and a federal 
judge subsequently determined that it failed to comply with existing 
statutes.8  Congress then rushed to provide a statutory basis for the program 
in order to avoid a detrimental interruption in intelligence collection.9 
Due to the unusual speed with which the legislation was passed and the 
“extraordinary powers” it gave to federal authorities, legislators worried 
that it might pose too great a threat to Americans’ privacy.10  Aware of the 
 
 2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 3. Id.  The Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) was designed to intercept electronic 
communications to and from the United States “where there was a reasonable basis to 
conclude that one party to the communication was a member of Al Qa’ida.” See OFFICES OF 
INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIA, NSA, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
1–6 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf. 
 4. Matt Sledge, FISA Warrantless Wiretapping Program Renewed by Senate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/
fisa-warrantless-wiretapping-senate_n2376039.html.  The House of Representatives had 
already passed a five-year extension in September 2012. See Ellen Nakashima, House Votes 
To Renew Contested Surveillance Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2012, at A2. 
 5. See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Cong. (2011–2012), H.R. 5949, Major 
Congressional Actions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:
HR05949:@@@R (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (noting that the Senate voted in favor of the 
bill 73–23 without amendment). 
 6. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at A1. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Carol D. Leonnig & Ellen Nakashima, Ruling Limited Spying Efforts—Move To 
Amend FISA Sparked by Judge’s Decision, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 9. Eric Lichtblau, James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, Reported Drop in Surveillance 
Spurred a Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1. 
 10. 153 CONG. REC. 34,571 (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 151 CONG. REC. E1640 
(daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Gary L. Ackerman).  FISA limited surveillance 
targeting to individuals for whom a federal judge found probable cause to believe that they 
were agents of a foreign power. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105, 
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).  The new statute initially permitted surveillance of any 
international communication, Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) § 2, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 
121 Stat. 552 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805a (Supp. V 2011)), and when it was renewed as 
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conventional wisdom that government has historically tended to overreact 
to security crises at the expense of civil liberties,11 some legislators insisted 
on including a sunset provision, not only in the legislation’s initial 
enactment but also in its first renewal less than one year later, to ensure a 
subsequent opportunity to reevaluate the legislation.12  A sunset was 
necessary, in the words of one lawmaker, “to make sure we have gotten 
both parts of this system right—effective intelligence collection and the 
protection of the privacy of Americans—before settling on what should be 
permanent law.”13 
The FISA Amendments Act’s sunset is not unique.  In fact, Congress has 
embedded sunset provisions in many post-9/11 expansions of government 
power—particularly expansions of government surveillance power.14  In 
each case, the circumstances of the provisions’ initial enactment raised 
concerns about their impact on civil liberties.  And to address those 
concerns, Congress limited the temporal scope of the statute.  The goal was 
to provide an opportunity for a sober second look at the legislation—outside 
the crisis atmosphere and with the benefit of additional information—to 
consider whether its civil liberties costs are too high.  Phrased differently, 
Congress has used sunsets to guard against the risk that legislative reactions 
to terrorism will result in long-term undesirable alterations to the law.15 
Congress is not alone in believing sunsets will serve this purpose.  
Legislators’ insistence on including sunsets is consistent with the opinion 
among many commentators—who portray sunsets’ effects as inconsistent 
and unpredictable in other contexts16—that sunsets are particularly likely to 
serve as useful error-correction mechanisms in counterterrorism 
legislation.17  This view suggests three reasons that post-crisis 
counterterrorism legislation might benefit from subsequent reexamination, 
making sunsets particularly appropriate:  First, cognitive biases triggered by 
terrorist attacks will cause both legislators and their constituents to 
overestimate the severity of the threat in the aftermath of a terrorist strike.  
Second, Congress will lack sufficient information at that time to make a 
 
the FAA, it authorized surveillance of communications so long as the target is “reasonably 
believed” to be located abroad. FAA § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006). 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.B.1.  Congress can, of course, amend or repeal any statute at any 
time.  This Article refers to statutes without sunsets as “long-term” legislation. 
 13. 153 CONG. REC. 34,539 (2007) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); see also infra note 
36 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra notes 26–31 and accompanying text. 
 17. This Article limits its discussion to counterterrorism surveillance legislation, for 
which its argument is particularly forceful because of the inherently secretive nature of 
surveillance.  But other counterterrorism statutes—statutes that enhance domestic executive-
branch powers designed to safeguard the physical security of American interests against 
terrorist attacks—share many of surveillance laws’ relevant characteristics and are therefore 
susceptible to the same concerns.  This Article makes no claims with respect to terrorism-
related legislation that does not authorize security measures—statutes providing 
compensation for victims or financial assistance to airlines are examples. 
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fully reasoned policy decision.  And finally, if the crisis itself is temporary, 
long-term changes in the law would be unnecessary. 
Sunsets are thus employed as a mechanism to force Congress to 
reevaluate policies when the crisis atmosphere and, presumably, its 
accompanying pathologies have passed.  At that time, the argument goes, 
legislators can reassess the legislation free from cognitive bias, armed with 
new information, and able to judge whether the need for particular policies 
has passed.  Based on that reassessment, Congress can then curtail or 
discontinue any measures that appear, in retrospect, to have conferred 
excessive security powers on the executive. 
This Article contends that this conventional wisdom is incorrect.  While 
the logic behind Congress’s reliance on sunsets has intuitive appeal, the 
argument that sunsets will remedy legislative overreaction to the terrorist 
threat is flawed in at least two ways.  First, its assumptions about the 
deliberative nature of the renewal process (i.e., (a) the reconsideration of 
counterterrorism statutes at the end of the sunset period will occur free of 
cognitive bias; (b) the information required to make a fully informed policy 
decision, which was lacking when the statute was initially passed, becomes 
available and will be utilized; and (c) the crisis that spurred the legislation 
will ultimately be recognized as temporary) are inaccurate when it comes to 
counterterrorism legislation.  And second, the argument fails to recognize 
the dominance of the President in counterterrorism policy formulation.  
Once these flaws are identified, it should come as no surprise that sunsets 
have not served their intended purpose, nor are they likely to do so in the 
future. 
That failure—which alone would call the wisdom of using sunsets into 
question—leads paradoxically, to sunset provisions exacerbating, rather 
than mitigating, long-term overreaction to terrorist threats.18  Because 
would-be objectors to a statute draw reassurance from a statute’s 
purportedly temporary nature, a sunset provision lowers the cost of 
enactment, easing the path for controversial security measures to become 
law.  As a result, legislators who would not have agreed to vote for a 
particular measure in long-term legislation can be more easily persuaded to 
approve that very same measure in a temporary bill.  This makes it more 
likely that a piece of post-crisis counterterrorism legislation will represent 
the very overreaction that legislators include sunsets to correct.  And, as this 
Article demonstrates, the fact that sunsets often fail to deliver on their error-
correction mission results in that overreaction to remain embedded in the 
law.  As a result, sunsets do not provide a remedy for unnecessarily extreme 
security policy; instead, they enable its long-term entrenchment. 
The argument proceeds in three parts.  After a brief discussion of the role 
of sunsets in U.S. law, Part I sets out Congress’s reasons for incorporating 
 
 18. See infra Part III. 
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sunsets in counterterrorism legislation, using the USA PATRIOT Act19 to 
illustrate how those arguments factor into the initial enactment of 
counterterrorism statutes.  It then shows that sunsets have fallen short of the 
goals for which they were included.  Next, Part II details the flaws in the 
pro-sunset argument, explaining why sunsets have failed to achieve their 
stated goals.  Finally, Part III argues that sunsets are not merely ineffective 
but that, paradoxically, they actually magnify the very concerns regarding 
legislative overreaction that they are deployed to alleviate.  Part III then 
considers the implications of these dynamics for the use of sunsets in 
counterterrorism legislation going forward, concluding that citizens and 
legislators concerned about the civil liberties costs of counterterrorism 
policy should not rely on sunsets alone as an effective answer to those 
concerns. 
I.  USE OF SUNSET PROVISIONS IN POST-9/11 
COUNTERTERRORISM LEGISLATION 
Counterterrorism surveillance statutes in the post-9/11 era have tended to 
confer on the executive extraordinary powers amidst an atmosphere of fear 
and uncertainty on an expedited schedule.  The fear, haste, lack of reliable 
information, and uncertainty regarding the scope or duration of the threat 
that results from this atmosphere all increase the likelihood of policymaking 
errors—particularly the tendency to overreact to crises at the expense of 
civil liberties.  This part details Congress’s efforts to use sunsets since 9/11 
to combat these potential policymaking errors.  First, it briefly explains 
sunset provisions’ longstanding role in American lawmaking beyond the 
counterterrorism context.  It then sets out the basis for Congress’s faith that 
sunsets can prevent indefinitely empowering the executive with overly 
expansive counterterrorism authorities, and it shows how sunsets’ ability to 
offer this reassurance has rendered them crucial to the passage of multiple 
counterterrorism statutes.  Finally, it demonstrates that congressional 
reexamination of these statutes has failed to reflect the benefits that sunsets 
are designed to capture. 
A.  Sunset Provisions in U.S. Law 
The idea of imposing temporal limits on government action is not novel, 
nor is it confined to use in counterterrorism statutes.  Such limits appear in 
at least one constitutional provision,20 and Congress has employed them in 
a myriad of policy contexts and for a host of reasons.  They have been used 
in statutes addressing military and financial emergencies,21 to facilitate 
 
 19. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act or PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (two-year limit on military appropriations). 
 21. See, e.g., Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 176 (1942) 
(subjecting specified war powers to a two-year sunset); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, 
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experimentation,22 to control (some say manipulate) budgets and 
appropriations,23 as a political bargaining chip,24 and to improve the 
performance of administrative agencies by combating ossification and 
interest group capture.25  At bottom, sunsets are an institutional design tool 
that forces Congress to return to policies that, for various reasons, may 
benefit from review.  Based on its reexamination, Congress can then modify 
the policy, renew it, or allow it to expire.  Despite sunsets’ widespread use, 
existing scholarship on them is generally pessimistic.  It has found that their 
ability to spark meaningful congressional evaluation of the virtues and vices 
of expiring legislation is unpredictable at best and is largely contingent on 
prevailing political circumstances.26  Other scholars are more explicitly 
skeptical.27 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 261 (1948) (stating that most major New Deal statutes 
contained sunsets). 
 22. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1827 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 701 (2006)); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 239 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (creating the office of 
Independent Counsel).  The statute was ultimately allowed to lapse after Kenneth Starr’s 
investigations into President Clinton. See Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1242 (2004). 
 23. See, e.g., Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified at 
2 U.S.C. § 900 (2006)) (raising the nation’s debt ceiling); Elizabeth Garrett, Accounting for 
the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 193 (2004) (discussing 
pathologies of sunsets in the budget context); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1026 (2011) (discussing pathologies of sunsets in the tax context); George 
K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 178–81 (2009) (advocating the use of sunsets in statutes that impact 
the federal budget). 
 24. See Kysar, supra note 23, at 1016 n.28 (the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 included a sunset to “appease libertarian concerns”). 
 25. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 298–313 (2d ed. 1979) 
(recommending five to ten year sunsets on all statutes creating federal agencies). 
 26. E.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 276–77 & 
n.118 (2007) (observing that renewal debates range from nonexistent to exceedingly 
intense).  Sunsets received brief attention in the 1970s and 1980s as being largely ineffective 
mechanisms to improve the efficiency of the regulatory state. See, e.g., Bruce Adams, 
Sunset:  A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 519–21 (1976); 
Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in Sunset Legislation:  
An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 407–08 (1981); Dan R. Price, 
Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 406–14, 418–19 (1978). 
Since then, sunsets had received only sporadic scholarly attention, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982) (stating that courts should be given 
“authority to determine whether a statute is obsolete”); Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on 
Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 189–94 (2008) (describing Justice Holmes’s belief that 
judges should determine when an emergency had ended), until they became common in 
counterterrorism and tax provisions. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK:  
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 80–83 (2006) (advocating that 
emergency powers be subject to sunsets); John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses and Democratic 
Deliberation:  Assessing the Significance of Sunset Provisions in Antiterrorism Legislation, 
48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 442 (2010); Gersen, supra; John Ip, Sunset Clauses and 
Counterterrorism Legislation, PUB. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 17–19) (on file 
with author); Katyal, supra note 22, at 1237 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should 
“prospectively declare” that some of its national security opinions will lapse as binding 
precedent at a time certain); Kysar, supra note 23; Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises:  
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But when it comes to counterterrorism legislation, several commentators 
who are highly skeptical of the value of sunsets in other contexts echo 
legislators in advocating for use of sunsets.  These accounts argue that 
“appropriately designed sunset clauses . . . can play a useful role in the 
governance of legislatively conferred counterterrorism powers”28 and that, 
under the right conditions, a sunset is “likely to provide far more 
advantages than drawbacks as a legislative response.”29 
B.  The Promise of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions 
Crises often require Congress to quickly enact legislation that provides 
the government the tools necessary to address the crisis but refrains from 
doing long-term damage to the law in the process.30  In the counterterrorism 
context, as was the case in the fall of 2001, this quandary often requires 
Congress to determine how to confer increased powers on the executive 
branch without infringing unnecessarily on civil liberties and constitutional 
rights.  As one legislator put it, the goal is to provide “law enforcement 
tools to respond to the deadly and unconventional threats we face” but 
 
The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006); 
Yin, supra note 23.  For more on the history of sunsets and other tools affecting the temporal 
scope of legislation, see, for example, Gersen, supra, at 249–61 (discussing the history and 
use of sunsets in federal, state, and international law). 
 27. See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM:  POWER, POLITICS, 
AND LIBERTY 14, 336 (2008); Davis, supra note 26, at 395–96 (most modifications are 
cosmetic); Finn, supra note 26, at 497, 501–02 (noting that sunsets “offer at best only a 
modest contribution to advancing or improving democratic deliberation” and “are generally 
an ineffective safeguard for democratic and constitutional norms”); Ip, supra note 26 
(manuscript at 17–19); Kysar, supra note 23, at 1051–68 (advocating a presumption against 
sunsets); Vern McKinley, Sunrises Without Sunsets:  Can Sunset Laws Reduce Regulation?, 
1995 REGULATION, no. 4, at 57 (“[I]n practice sunset provisions have not been very effective 
. . . .”), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1995/10/
v18n4-6.pdf. 
 28. Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 1) (arguing for the use of sunsets accompanied by 
“other mechanisms of accountability”); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 131–32 
(advocating the use of sunsets supplemented by supermajority voting requirements). 
 29. Gersen, supra note 26, at 248 (advocating a presumption for the use of sunsets in 
response to newly recognized, and therefore unpredictable, risks); see id. at 249 (“[W]ithin 
certain well-specified policy domains, temporary legislation should be embraced as the rule 
rather than eschewed even as an exception.”); Kysar, supra note 23, at 1009–10, 1066–67 & 
nn.251–54 (condemning most sunsets as “worse than ineffective,” but relaxing this critique 
with respect to legislation meant to be temporary or enacted in “crisis situations”—including 
terrorist attacks).  Professor Gersen supports his conclusion with an analysis of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006), which does not involve security 
measures and thus does not represent the type of counterterrorism legislation on which this 
Article focuses. 
 30. See generally John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception:  A 
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004) (describing various models 
of emergency power, and noting that emergency power is “conservative” in the sense that “it 
is aimed at resolving the threat to the system in such a way that the legal/constitutional 
system is restored to its previous state”). 
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ensure that “we do not at the same time endanger the basic civil liberties 
and freedoms that we hold so dear.”31 
Sunsets have been legislators’ go-to tool in efforts to strike this balance; 
since 9/11, Congress has extended sweeping surveillance powers to the 
executive branch and relied on sunsets to prompt subsequent scrutiny of 
those authorities.  In addition, sunsets have proved indispensable in 
facilitating legislative compromise on contentious counterterrorism bills. 
1.  The Purpose of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions 
Legislators have articulated three characteristics of counterterrorism 
legislation that they hope sunsets will address—hope that is echoed in the 
academy even by scholars highly skeptical of sunsets’ value in other 
contexts.32  First, there is the impact of cognitive bias.  If the emotions or 
sense of urgency inherent in times of perceived crisis cause legislators and 
the public to misperceive risk, sunsets are held out as a “cure for temporary 
passions” that might spur Congress to overreact.33  When it came to the 
PATRIOT Act, legislators looked to sunsets to provide the opportunity to 
“revisit whether [the law] strikes the proper balance between securing our 
safety and ensuring our freedom”34 with “the benefit of greater thought, in 
an atmosphere more conducive to protecting our liberties than 
understandably was the situation immediately after a horrific, wrenching, 
deadly attack.”35 
The same was true for legislation codifying the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program.  The Protect America Act, a precursor to the FISA Amendments 
Act, was subject to a very short sunset to prevent “any errors caused” by the 
“expedited procedure with which it was enacted [to] persist.”36  And 
FISA’s “lone wolf” provision—which permits electronic surveillance of 
noncitizens involved domestically in international terrorist activity but 
unaffiliated with any foreign terrorist organization37—was subject to sunset 
due to similar concerns that it conferred excessively “sweeping” 
authorities.38  In addition to believing that sunsets temper the impact of 
cognitive bias, Congress views sunsets as aids in gathering information.  
 
 31. 151 CONG. REC. E1584 (daily ed. July 22, 2005) (statement of Rep. Patrick J. 
Kennedy). 
 32. See Gersen, supra note 26, at 249; Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 1); Kysar, supra 
note 23, at 1014; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 131–32. 
 33. Gersen, supra note 26, at 250. 
 34. 151 CONG. REC. 28,811 (2005) (statement of Sen. Clinton). 
 35. 152 CONG. REC. 2437 (2006) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 36. 153 CONG. REC. E1771 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Udall); see also 
154 CONG. REC. 1008 (2008) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (“Congress wisely employed a 6-
month sunset to ensure that the shortcomings of this temporary law could be explored at 
length and properly corrected.”). 
 37. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801 (2006). 
 38. 150 CONG. REC. 25,700 (2004) (statement of Rep. Holt); see also 151 CONG. REC. 
25,616 (2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) (stating that the “‘lone wolf’ provision” is one of the 
most “worrisome” powers). 
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When insufficient information is available for reasoned decision making at 
the time of initial enactment, legislators can use the sunset period as a trial 
run, allowing them to see whether policy operates as intended before 
making any long-term decisions.39  Sunsets ensure an “opportunity to 
reassess whether these tools are yielding the intended results in the war on 
terror.”40  Stated differently, they are expected to assist in providing 
“Congress the opportunity to regularly review [the legislation] and fine-tune 
it to adapt” to new information.41  Many members of Congress found the 
sunset provision of the original PATRIOT Act nonnegotiable “because it 
lets them see how well [the measures] work . . .  and how responsibly they 
have been used.”42  Similarly, legislators concerned about the FISA 
Amendments Act insisted on a sunset so that they could come back and 
assess “its effectiveness against terrorism and its compromises of 
privacy.”43 
Third, Congress sees sunsets as a useful tool to address “temporary” 
crises.  When a crisis calls for temporary policy, the subsequent scrutiny 
prompted by sunsets can serve to ensure that measures that are no longer 
necessary do not become an enduring part of the law.  Several legislators 
supported the PATRIOT Act’s “dramatic expansion of Federal power 
because our country was at war,” while insisting that “these powers should 
contain sunset provisions” so that “after the emergency was over the 
government would again return to a level consistent to a free society.”44 
2.  Sunset Provisions’ Role in Counterterrorism Lawmaking 
Given the range of pitfalls that legislators rely upon sunsets to combat, it 
is not surprising that they have played a significant role in legislative 
negotiations.  In fact, it seems that including a sunset was “the price of 
passing” several pieces of counterterrorism legislation.45  The story of the 
 
 39. See Gersen, supra note 26, at 266–72; Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 10). 
 40. 152 CONG. REC. 2440 (2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell); see also, e.g., 151 CONG. 
REC. 25,616 (2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher) (“The most effective way for Congress to 
maintain oversight of the most controversial powers that the PATRIOT Act conveys is to 
sunset [them].”). 
 41. 151 CONG. REC. 16,934 (2005) (statement of Rep. Levin). 
 42. Karen Hosler, Bills Would Give Ashcroft Many Anti-terrorism Tools, BALT. SUN, 
Oct. 10, 2001, at 7A; see also, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 2793 (2006) (statement of Rep. Nadler); 
152 CONG. REC. 2425 (2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (wanting to “take another look down 
the road to make sure we did not act too hastily”). 
 43. 153 CONG. REC. 34,571 (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“[W]hen making such 
dramatic changes to the Nation’s terrorist surveillance regime, we should err on the side of 
caution” and revisit them after “the new regime has been tested.”). 
 44. 151 CONG. REC. 25,618 (2005) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (“[W]hen the war 
was won . . . those powers [subject to sunset] would be rescinded . . . .”); 151 CONG. REC. 
17,001 (2005) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher). See generally 151 CONG. REC. 16,924 
(2005) (statement of Rep. Cunningham) (“God willing, there should be a day we will not 
need a PATRIOT Act.”); 151 CONG. REC. 16,889 (2005) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (“The 
idea of these measures was always that they would be temporary.”). 
 45. 154 CONG. REC. 385 (2008) (statement of Rep. Lungren); see also, e.g., 151 CONG. 
REC. 16,927 (2005) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) (noting that she only “supported the 
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PATRIOT Act’s initial enactment provides insight into sunsets’ central role 
in this regard. 
Cleanup at Ground Zero had barely begun.  The stock market had just 
reopened.  Neither the New York City subways nor the nation’s airports had 
resumed normal operations.  In short, the country was still reeling from the 
events of September 11th.  Yet, sharing a sense of urgency stemming from 
concern that the United States remained vulnerable to further attacks, both 
Congress and the Bush Administration were hard at work drafting new 
counterterrorism legislation less than a week after 9/11. 
Administration officials pressed for quick congressional action and 
provided to Congress proposed legislation—the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 
(ATA)—that represented a dramatic expansion of executive branch police 
and intelligence-collection powers.46  As just one example, it authorized the 
Attorney General to detain alien terrorism suspects indefinitely without 
charge.  Despite consensus on the need to move quickly, however, 
legislators from both sides of the aisle were sufficiently concerned about the 
ATA that they insisted on “fine-tuning it to minimize the infringement of 
civil liberties.”47 
Both the House and the Senate worked nearly around the clock to 
develop their own bills, each producing a proposal by the first week of 
October.  The Senate’s Uniting and Strengthening America Act (USA 
Act)48 incorporated most of the Administration’s requested powers, albeit 
with moderate additional civil liberties protections.49  It did not, however, 
include a sunset provision.50 
The Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (House PATRIOT Act)51 was unanimously approved by all 
thirty-six members of the House Judiciary Committee—Democrats and 
 
[PATRIOT Act] because of these sunset provisions”); 154 CONG. REC. 14,231 (2008) 
(statement of Sen. Bond) (stating that he “agreed to a . . . sunset” on the FAA as a 
“bipartisan compromise”). 
 46. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, H.R. 2896, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Beryl A. 
Howell, Seven Weeks:  The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 
1154, 1161 (2004) (describing the bill). 
 47. Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 
107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Federalism, & Property Rights). See generally Administration’s Draft Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“[T]his bill should not do anything to take away the 
freedom of innocent citizens.”). 
 48. Uniting and Strengthening America Act, S. 1510, 107th Cong. (2001).  After 
Mohammed Atta was identified as one of the 9/11 hijackers, the original name for the bill—
the ATA—was scrapped because it was too similar to Atta. Howell, supra note 46, at 1153 
n.43. 
 49. See Howell, supra note 46, at 1156–58 (describing the USA Act). 
 50. S. 1510. 
 51. H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. § 353 (2001). 
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Republicans alike.52  This bill was more judicious than the Senate’s USA 
Act in the powers it granted to the executive.  It did not, for example, 
contain any expansion of the power to conduct delayed notice, or “sneak-
and-peek” searches—in which the government may execute a search 
warrant without contemporaneously informing the property’s occupant.53  It 
also required judicial approval of some kinds of information sharing among 
government agencies,54 and it set a higher bar for obtaining court orders to 
acquire certain types of evidence.55 
Even with this comparatively cautious bill, members of the House 
Judiciary Committee feared that, due to the haste and pressure under which 
it was drafted, the bill provided too much power to the executive branch, 
posed too great a threat to civil liberties, and reflected insufficient 
consideration.56  Consequently, they insisted that the surveillance powers in 
the House PATRIOT Act sunset.57  Indeed, a bipartisan group of more than 
two-dozen cosponsors emphasized the sunset as “the keystone to the 
overwhelming support” for the bill in committee.58 
After the Senate approved the USA Act 96–1,59 members of the 
Administration began to pressure House leadership to bring that bill to a 
vote before the full House, rather than the bipartisan House PATRIOT 
Act.60  Executive officials strongly preferred the USA Act for two reasons:  
it was more similar to the Administration’s original request, and it did not 
contain a sunset provision.61 
In late-night negotiations among congressional leaders and executive 
officials over which bill the House would vote on, “the sunset was a key 
sticking point” because the executive branch “strenuously opposed” 
including one.62  But as House leadership knew that any bill “would likely 
 
 52. Audrey Hudson, McCain Stalls Anti-terror Package, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at 
A11. 
 53. House PATRIOT Act, H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. § 353 (2001). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 156. 
 56. See Audrey Hudson, House To Vote on Time-Limited Anti-terrorism Bill; Feingold 
Says He’s Worried About Threat to Civil Liberties, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at A3 
(stating that Judiciary Committee members indicated that absent time-consuming hearings to 
consider a counterterrorism bill, they could not support the sweeping changes it included 
without a sunset); John Lancaster, House Approves Terrorism Measure; Bill Grants Bulk Of 
Bush’s Request, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2001, at A1. 
 57. House PATRIOT Act, H.R. 2975. See generally Hudson, supra note 56; Lancaster, 
supra note 56. 
 58. Hudson, supra note 56. 
 59. Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate’s, but 
with 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Hudson, supra note 52. See generally Jesse J. Holland, Senator Insists on Debating 
Terror Bill, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2001, at 12; John Lancaster, Senate Passes Expansion of 
Electronic Surveillance:  Anti-terrorism Bill Is Set for House Debate Today, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 12, 2001, at A1.  
 62. David Boyer, House OKs Anti-terror Bill; At Odds with Senate over Money 
Laundering, Wiretaps, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A1. 
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fail in the House without a ‘sunset,’”63 they agreed to bring the House USA 
Act64 to the floor—a new bill containing several security measures that had 
been in the Senate’s USA Act but that were not included in the House 
PATRIOT Act—only if executive officials conceded that it would also 
include a sunset.65 
In the end, the House passed a version of the USA Act that included a 
sunset, but also expanded power for sneak-and-peek searches66 and omitted 
several of the oversight provisions that had been in the House PATRIOT 
Act—such as limits on the circumstances under which the Justice 
Department could share grand jury information with other government 
agencies,67 extensive reporting requirements regarding the government’s 
acquisition of stored communications,68 and the establishment of a Deputy 
Inspector General for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties charged with creating 
a plan for oversight of the Justice Department.69  The House thus 
extended—or relaxed limitations on—multiple executive powers in return 
for a sunset. 
Once both Houses of Congress had passed versions of the USA Act, the 
discrepancy between the House and Senate bills with respect to a sunset 
was one of the factors that slowed “[t]ense negotiations” to reconcile the 
bills.70  Insisting on a sunset became “the key thing” that legislators in both 
Houses concerned about the legislation’s impact on fundamental rights 
clung to as a means to include “some protection.”71  These legislators 
agreed that “[i]f there isn’t a legitimate sunset, [they would] have some real 
trouble supporting the bill.”72  Negotiations between a small group of 
 
 63. Jess Bravin, Questions of Security:  Congress Reaches Accord on Antiterror Bill, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at A8. See generally Boyer, supra note 62; Hosler, supra note 42 
(noting that the House Majority Leader “estimated that much of the House support for the 
measure was based” on the inclusion of a sunset provision); Howell, supra note 46, at 1176; 
William Bendix & Paul J. Quirk, Deliberating Security and Democracy:  The Patriot Act and 
Surveillance Policy, 2001–2008, at 12 (March 2009) (unpublished paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with author). 
 64. Uniting and Strengthening America Act, H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. § 213 (2001). 
 65. Boyer, supra note 62; see Bendix & Quirk, supra note 63. 
 66. H.R. 2975 § 213. 
 67. House PATRIOT Act, H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001).  Senator Leahy articulated 
the concerns this type of information sharing raises: 
Federal criminal investigators have enormous discretion, with little statutory or 
constitutional guidance for how they interview people, conduct physical 
surveillance, recruit informants in organizations, and request access to records they 
consider “relevant” to an investigation.  All that information would be eligible to 
be disseminated widely . . . if it meets the definition of “foreign intelligence” or 
“foreign intelligence information.” 
147 CONG. REC. 20,672 (2001). 
 68. H.R. 2975 § 112. 
 69. Id. § 702. 
 70. Melanie Fonder & Noelle Straub, Anti-terrorism Bill Stalled by House-Senate 
Disputes, HILL, Oct. 17, 2001. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (quoting Sen. John Corzine and noting Sens. Maria Cantwell, Carl Levin, and 
Paul Wellstone’s agreement with this sentiment). 
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House and Senate leadership, which were complicated by an anthrax attack 
that forced legislative staff to “work literally in phone booths and in 
hallways and from their homes and off laptops and cell phones,” ultimately 
produced the USA PATRIOT Act.73  The final bill included both the 
executive powers from the USA Act and a four-year sunset provision.74  
President Bush signed the bill into law on October 26, 2001—just seven 
weeks after the terrorist attacks.75  But congressional insistence on a sunset 
meant that many of its surveillance powers would expire at the end of 2005 
unless reauthorized.76 
At first blush, sunset provisions seem to be a valuable tool for addressing 
legislators’ concerns.  If the risk of overreaction to security threats is real—
a point on which both legislators and observers agree77—the case for 
including a mechanism to limit the duration of that overreaction is a 
compelling one, particularly if it facilitates legislative compromise during 
exigencies.  The expectation was that as the sunset date approached, 
Congress would reexamine the sunsetting provisions in a noncrisis 
atmosphere and with the benefit of information regarding their 
implementation.78  It could thus assess these policies’ continued value in 
the fight against terrorism as well as their costs—in terms of dollars, 
opportunity costs, and constriction of civil liberties—and make any 
adjustments that the results of those assessments indicated.  This is not what 
happened. 
C.  The Disappointing Performance of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions 
Measuring sunsets’ success is not a straightforward exercise.  Congress’s 
stated goal for sunsets is that they will prompt a reexamination of statutory 
provisions so that legislators can engage in deliberations at a time when 
their view of the issues is no longer distorted by cognitive bias, when they 
can incorporate information about the policies’ implementation into their 
decision making, and when they can assess dispassionately the continued 
need for robust counterterrorism measures.79  But the point of sunsets is not 
to prompt debate for debate’s sake; it is to allow Congress to identify and 
correct policymaking errors by eliminating or modifying provisions that, in 
retrospect, appear unwise, ineffective, excessively costly, or otherwise 
undesirable.  In other words, to be successful, sunsets must lead to renewed 
consideration that actually results in improved policy (or a conscious 
determination to adhere to existing policy). 
 
 73. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code); 147 CONG. REC. 20,695 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 74. PATRIOT Act §§ 201–224. 
 75. Jonathan Krim & Robert O’Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era; 
U.S. Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6. 
 76. Lancaster, supra note 56. 
 77. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A. 
 78. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 79. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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On this metric, optimism about sunset provisions has been misplaced.  
Renewal debates have not been free from the influence of cognitive bias, 
nor has Congress viewed sunsetting statutes as potentially temporary.  The 
most striking sunset failure, however, has come in the realm of information.  
In the end, all meaningful policy modifications have been prompted by 
forces exogenous to the statutes themselves, and whether or not the 
legislation is improved has borne little relationship to the presence of 
sunsets. 
1.  Cognitive Bias by the Numbers 
There is no means of measuring the extent to which cognitive biases 
color renewal debates, but it is plain that any cognitive bias surrounding 
terrorist attacks does not disappear within the time span of a typical sunset 
provision.  Public concern about terrorist attacks is not, of course, what it 
was in November 2001, but anxiety remains elevated even now.  As of 
March 2012, over a third of the population remained either “very” or 
“somewhat” worried that they or someone in their family will become a 
victim of terrorism,80 and 65 percent still worry a “great deal” or a “fair 
amount” about the possibility of future terrorist attacks.81  Currently, 63 
percent of Americans agree or strongly agree that the United States faces 
greater security threats today than it did during the Cold War.82  While 
identifying a “correct” level of concern is impossible, these existing anxiety 
levels are inconsistent with the true threat posed by terrorism.  If current 
statistics hold true, Americans are almost four times more likely to be 
struck by lightning than to be killed in a terrorist attack in any given year.83  
These public assessments of the terrorist risk indicate that cognitive bias, 
and the resulting inflation of the terrorist threat, remains at work when 
Congress considers whether to renew sunsetting statutes. 
 
 80. Terrorism in the United States, GALLUP.COM, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/
terrorism-united-states.aspx (last updated Jan. 22, 2013) (showing that the segment of the 
population similarly concerned in 2000 was 24 percent; today it is 36 percent). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Benjamin Valentino, U.S. Foreign Policy Poll, Apr. 26–May 2, 2012 (unpublished 
survey), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~benv/files/poll%20responses%20by%20
party%20ID.pdf. 
 83. Nate Silver, Crunching the Risk Numbers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2010, 9:37 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703481004574646963713065116.html 
(concluding that the odds of dying in a terrorist attack for a “Westerner is about a one in 
three million each year”); Lightning Safety:  Medical Aspects of Lightning, NAT’L WEATHER 
SERVICE, http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/medical.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). See 
generally John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion, 37 INT’L SEC. 81 
(2012) (arguing that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated, discussing the monetary costs 
of countering that perceived threat, and discussing why “anxieties about terrorism persist 
despite exceedingly limited evidence that much fear is justified”). 
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2.  Counterterrorism Provisions As Temporary Provisions? 
There is also some question with respect to whether post-9/11 
counterterrorism legislation was designed as a temporary response to a 
temporary crisis.  It is true that the immediate post-9/11 period was 
repeatedly referred to as an “emergency,”84 and at least some legislators 
viewed elements of the PATRIOT Act as experimental policies whose 
continued need should be reassessed at the end of the sunset period.85  But 
by the time the first sunset date approached, many legislators had ceased to 
view these powers (or never had viewed them) as anything other than long-
term necessities.  The initial renewal in 2005 of the PATRIOT Act 
produced two new statutes—the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 200586 and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional 
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006.87  These bills eliminated the 
sunset on fourteen of the PATRIOT Act’s sixteen expiring provisions, 
making them a lasting part of the law.88  The two PATRIOT Act provisions 
remaining subject to sunset89 have since been renewed, unchanged, on 
multiple occasions and are currently scheduled to sunset on June 15, 
2015.90  The lone wolf provision of FISA, which was put on the PATRIOT 
Act’s sunset schedule when it was enacted, has been similarly extended 
despite the fact that, as of 2009, it had never been relied upon in an 
investigation.91 
Some post-9/11 additions to executive surveillance powers seem plainly 
designed to result in long-term legislation.  As an initial matter, it is 
difficult to characterize the PATRIOT Act powers that were not limited to 
counterterrorism investigations or that law enforcement agencies had been 
asking for since long before 9/11 as temporary responses to a 
counterterrorism emergency.92 
 
 84. E.g., 147 CONG. REC. 22,242 (2001) (statement of Rep. Cummings) (arguing for 
enforcement of hate crime laws in “this time of national emergency”); 147 CONG. REC. 
19,626 (2001) (statement of Rep. McKeon) (discussing the 9/11 attacks “and the resulting 
national emergency”); 147 CONG. REC. 18,027 (2001) (statement of Sen. Helms) (arguing to 
enhance the president’s power “in this time of national emergency”); Address Before a Joint 
Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 
11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1143 (Sept. 20, 2001) (pledging that the U.S. will “come together 
. . . during this emergency”). 
 85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 86. Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
 87. Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006). 
 88. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 102(a). 
 89. Sections 206 (roving wiretaps) and 215 (“business records” orders) of the PATRIOT 
Act remain subject to sunset. Id. § 102(b). 
 90. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 91. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 103; Letter 
from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 5 
(Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/09/
leahyletter.pdf. 
 92. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency:  States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2004) (asserting that the PATRIOT Act was 
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Similarly, at least portions of the post-9/11 amendments to FISA were 
plainly seen as “modernization” of a statute that had been rendered partially 
obsolete by the technological advances of recent decades, not as temporary 
legislation to address a finite crisis.93  The FISA Amendments Act thus 
represents the codification of a fundamental shift in the executive’s 
authority to acquire international communications—first implemented 
through the President’s extrastatutory Terrorist Surveillance Program94—
rather than a temporary surveillance power granted for the duration of a 
finite terrorist threat.95 
If legislators either never expected or had ceased to expect 
counterterrorism measures to become obsolete prior to their sunset, sunsets’ 
role as a means to allow temporary legislation to expire was never in play.  
It is therefore no surprise that none of the counterterrorism powers extended 
to the executive branch since 9/11 have been permitted to lapse.  This might 
mean that Congress thought carefully and determined that it got it right with 
these statutes the first time around.  But as Part II explains, other forces at 
work in the counterterrorism policymaking environment are more likely the 
causes of this entrenchment. 
3.  Obstacles to the Flow of Information 
The most dramatic divergence between sunsets’ ideals and their reality 
has come in their information-related effects.  The expectation is that, while 
a sunsetting statute is in force, legislators will learn “how well [the 
measures] work and how responsibly [they’ve] been used,”96 and adjust the 
policies accordingly.  To be sure, some counterterrorism renewal debates 
have generated an extensive congressional record, and Congress has heard 
 
not an emergency measure); Kam Wong, The USA PATRIOT Act I:  Some Unanswered 
Questions, 34 J. SOC. L. 1, 192 (2006) (many of the provisions the executive branch 
requested were “just off the shelf items from the 1996 anti-terrorism legislation”). 
 93. E.g., Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet on FISA Modernization (Aug. 3, 
2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/
20070919-1.html. 
 94. The TSP first was codified as the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA), which sunset 
after six months. Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.  It was then renewed as the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat 2436 (codified in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C.).  Like the TSP, both the PAA and the FAA provided the 
authority to engage in “intelligence activities directed at persons overseas” without 
establishing probable cause that the target was an agent of a foreign power. See 
Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 29 (2007) (testimony of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Asst. 
Att’y Gen.); see also PAA § 2 (exempting from FISA’s limitations all communications 
“directed at” targets outside the United States). 
 95. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA:  Of Needles in 
Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1641–49 (2010) (describing the evolution of the TSP into 
first the PAA and then the FAA); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA 
Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty:  A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 407, 415 (2009) (“Like the PAA in 2007, the FAA in 2008 appears to 
authorize the TSP.”). 
 96. See Hosler, supra note 42. 
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from an array of witnesses hailing from law enforcement, intelligence, 
academia, think tanks, advocacy organizations, and the private sector.97  
But a close inspection of these debates indicates that Congress has largely 
continued to rely upon incomplete—and sometimes misleading—
information.  Moreover, any information indicating a potential need for 
error correction has been addressed through purely cosmetic 
modifications.98 
When it comes to Congress’s lack of information, there is plenty of 
blame to go around; much of it can be laid at Congress’s own feet for 
failing to request information that would allow it to evaluate policy 
effectiveness or executive abuse or waste.  Congress’s (unclassified) routine 
information gathering has been limited to requests for aggregate numbers—
how many times a particular tool has been employed, whether courts 
rejected or modified any proposed surveillance orders, etc.—whose 
implications are difficult to discern.99  One commentator has labeled this 
kind of information-sharing “privacy theater,” a ritual that perpetuates the 
“‘myth’ that counting surveillance activity indicates that someone 
somewhere is drawing lessons from these statistics and that the surveillance 
system, in turn, will be reformed if needed.”100 
Congress’s dearth of knowledge became clear as the PATRIOT Act’s 
first renewal approached in December 2005.  Concerns about the FBI’s use 
of National Security Letters (NSLs)—which permit investigators, without 
judicial review, to obtain certain types of records, such as credit reports 
from financial institutions and subscriber information from communications 
 
 97. E.g., USA PATRIOT Act:  A Review for the Purpose of Reauthorization, Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); USA PATRIOT Act, Hearings 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Heather 
MacDonald, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; Att’y Gen. Alberto 
Gonzales; David Kris, former Asst. Att’y Gen., National Security Division); Implementation 
of the USA PATRIOT Act:  Crime, Terrorism and the Age of Technology, Hearings Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security, 
109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of James Dempsey, Exec. Dir., Center for Democracy and 
Technology; Peter Swire, Prof. of Law, Ohio State University); Implementation of the USA 
Patriot Act:  Sections of the Act that Address the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of James Baker, Counsel, Intelligence 
Policy, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice); Implementation of 
the USA Patriot Act:  Effect of Sections 203(B) and (D) on Information Sharing, Hearings 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Security, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Maureen Baginski, Exec. Asst. Dir., Office of 
Intelligence, FBI; Timothy Edgar, National Security Policy Counsel, ACLU; Barry Sabin, 
Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). 
 98. Some might argue that the same can be said for any congressional debate.  But the 
promise of sunsets was, in part, that they would lead to more informed policy. 
 99. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006); USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 109. 
 100. Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 287, 311 (2008). 
 2013] COUNTERTERRORISM SUNSET PROVISIONS 1795 
providers101—only registered on Congress’s radar after the Washington 
Post published a story about them in November 2005.  According to the 
report, the FBI was issuing tens of thousands of NSLs yearly—a sharp 
increase from pre-9/11 numbers—and retaining all resulting records, even 
those pertaining only to innocent people.102  Only at this point—long after 
Congress had completed its hearings on the PATRIOT Act renewal and 
with the sunset date less than two months away—did legislators recognize 
the need to probe more deeply into the executive branch’s use of its NSL 
authorities.  In other words, the initial PATRIOT Act reauthorization bills 
were passed without Congress ever knowing the true scope of the FBI’s 
activities.  It was not innate congressional curiosity but successful 
investigative journalism that prompted more aggressive inquiries.103 
Congress’s information deficit has continued to plague PATRIOT Act 
renewals.  During the Act’s most recent renewal, a pair of Democratic 
senators raised objections to the use of the business-records provision of the 
PATRIOT Act, which authorizes the FBI to seek an order from a judge to 
obtain “any tangible thing” that is “relevant” to an investigation into 
terrorism or espionage.104  Justice Department officials argued that 
Congress needed to reauthorize this provision, in part, because an 
“important sensitive collection program” relies on it for its authority.105  
But lawmakers briefed on the program complained that critical information 
about how the government uses that authority remains unknown to most 
members of Congress and to the American people.106  Moreover, these 
lawmakers alleged that “most Americans would be stunned to learn” how 
the government interprets this authority and that “there is now a significant 
gap between what most Americans think the law allows and what the 
government secretly claims the law allows.”107  One senator predicted that 
 
 101. 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 
(2006); 50 U.S.C. § 436 (2006). 
 102. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 103. A requirement that the executive report the total number of requests made pursuant 
to NSL authority exempts one of the most ubiquitous varieties of NSLs—requests for 
subscriber information (the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll 
billing records of a subscriber), USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005 § 118(c)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006), skewing the numbers of 
NSLs downward significantly.  And a congressionally mandated Inspector General report 
into the use of NSLs produced highly valuable information. Id. §§ 106A, 119; see infra notes 
124–27 and accompanying text.  But it was a one-time audit, only covering NSL use up to 
2007. 
 104. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106; Letter 
from Sens. Ron Wyden & Mark Udall to Att’y Gen. Eric Holder (Mar. 15, 2012), available 
at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/325953-85512347-senators-ron-wyden-mark-
udall-letter-to.html. 
 105. USA Patriot Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Todd M. 
Hinnen, Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., National Security Division, Department of Justice). 
 106. Letter from Sens. Ron Wyden & Mark Udall, supra note 104; see also Reauthorizing 
the USA PATRIOT Act:  Ensuring Liberty and Security, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 80 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 107. Letter from Sens. Wyden & Udall, supra note 104. 
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when the American people find out how their government has secretly 
interpreted the PATRIOT Act, they are going to be stunned and they are 
going to be angry.  They are going to ask Senators:  Did you know what 
this law actually permits?  Why didn’t you know before you voted on 
it?108 
Even when new information has motivated legislators to modify an 
expiring statute, they have accepted cosmetic means of addressing their 
concerns.  For example, after failing to convince fellow legislators to 
approve some additional civil liberties protections in the 2005 renewal of 
the PATRIOT Act—such as adding a requirement that the government 
provide reasons why it believes that certain items it seeks are connected to 
terrorism—a bipartisan block of forty-six senators filibustered the proposed 
renewal bill.109  Further negotiations generated a compromise deal whose 
resulting modifications then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen 
Specter described as “cosmetic.”110  It provided, for example, that NSLs 
could be used to acquire library records only if that library provides 
“electronic communication service[s].”111  But this language merely 
restated preexisting law; NSLs were already limited to service providers.112  
More broadly, the deal included several new reporting requirements that 
took the “privacy theater” form of demands for aggregate numbers.113  As 
Senator Specter pointed out, “sometimes cosmetics will make a beauty out 
of a beast and provide enough cover for senators to change their vote.”114  
But enacting political cover for legislators does not necessarily result in 
more well-considered policy—sunsets’ purported aim. 
 
 108. 157 CONG. REC. S3372, S3386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden). 
 109. Charles Babington, 4 GOP Senators Hold Firm Against Patriot Act Renewal, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A4; see also Eric Lichtblau, Extension of Patriot Act Faces Threat of 
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at A26. 
 110. Feingold Appears Alone in Patriot Act Filibuster, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 
16, 2006, at A7. 
 111. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 § 5, 
18 U.S.C. § 2709(f) (2006).  Electronic communications service is defined as “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).  Other adjustments to the NSL provision revised authority 
relating to judicial review, confidentiality, and nondisclosure of NSLs and clarified that 
individuals who receive FISA orders can challenge nondisclosure requirements. USA 
PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 § 3, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
 113. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106A, Pub. L. 
No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (business-records orders); § 107(a) (voluntary disclosures 
by private actors of the contents of electronic communications); § 108 (roving wiretaps); 
§ 109 (physical searches & use of trap-and-trace devices and pen registers); § 114 (delayed-
notice searches); § 118 (NSLs regarding U.S. persons); § 126 (data-mining practices). See 
generally FAA § 702(l)(2), 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(2) (dissemination of U.S. persons’ 
identities acquired through FAA surveillance); Letter from Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen., 
to Sen. Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Apr. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2010rept.pdf. 
 114. Feingold Appears Alone in Patriot Act Filibuster, supra note 110. 
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The executive has also served as an obstacle to useful exploitation of 
information.  Sometimes, it has simply been reluctant or unwilling to share 
information.  In 2003, for example, lawmakers characterized Attorney 
General John Ashcroft as “guarded or unresponsive” to Congress’s 
questions about PATRIOT Act powers.115  Similarly, when considering the 
codification of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee was forced, after making “no fewer than nine formal requests,” 
to subpoena the information and documents it wanted.116  In the end, nearly 
three-quarters of the members of the Senate voted on the legislation without 
having been briefed on the program it was enacted to replace.117 
At other times, the executive has been seemingly incapable of answering 
Congress’s questions.  In fact, despite legislators’ worries that the FISA 
Amendments Act’s powers would inadvertently trench on Americans’ 
privacy, neither Congress nor the executive branch has kept track of how 
the surveillance program has impacted U.S. persons’ communications.118  
Congress was informed that, on at least one occasion, the FISA Court—the 
secret court that evaluates government applications for FISA surveillance 
orders119—found that some collection carried out under the FISA 
Amendments Act violated the Fourth Amendment.120  Yet it was not until 
2012 that legislators sought data regarding the privacy impact of the statute.  
In response to these inquiries, the executive informed Congress that it was 
neither reasonably possible to supply even an estimate of how many 
Americans’ communications have been intercepted under the statute121 nor 
feasible to conduct a study to determine this number.122  Despite the 
absence of this information, the Act was renewed with no alterations for 
five more years.123 
Congress’s experience with NSLs illustrates another potential executive 
branch failing—it has, at times, provided inaccurate information.  After the 
Washington Post story in 2005 raised questions regarding the FBI’s use of 
NSLs, Congress instructed the Inspector General of the Justice Department 
 
 115. Emily Pierce, Ashcroft Rapped Over Oversight, ROLL CALL, June 9, 2003, at 1. See 
generally Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Assailed On Policy Review; Lawmakers Say Oversight Is 
Blocked, WASH. POST, Aug 21, 2002, at A2 (stating that months went by with no response 
from Attorney General Ashcroft to a list of PATRIOT Act–related questions). 
 116. Michael A. Fletcher, Senators Subpoena the White House, WASH. POST, June 28, 
2007, at A1. 
 117. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 425.  This executive noncooperation tended to diminish 
(but not disappear) as sunsets approached. See infra Part II.B. 
 118. See FAA Sunsets Extension Act of 2012, S. REP. NO. 112-174, at 8, 10 (2012). 
 119. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006). 
 120. See Letter from Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legal Affairs, ODNI, to Sen. Ron Wyden, 
Member, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (July 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2012/07/dni072012.pdf. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Letter from I. Charles McCullough, III, Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., to 
Sens. Ron Wyden and Mark Udall (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.wyden
.senate.gov/download/response-letter-from-ic-inspector-general. 
 123. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
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to conduct an audit evaluating NSLs’ use and effectiveness.124  The results 
of this audit, released in 2007 and 2008, revealed significant, systemic 
abuse.125  The FBI had not only circumvented statutory requirements and 
obtained information beyond the scope of its authorities, but it had also 
provided inaccurate information to Congress.126  As a result, “Capitol Hill 
was peppered” with Justice Department efforts to correct statements it had 
provided during the 2005 reauthorization process that “need[ed] 
clarification,” because “the reports provided to Congress . . . did not 
accurately reflect the FBI’s use of NSLs.”127 
Groups outside the government have, at times, also been 
counterproductive when it comes to generating information for renewal 
debates.  Traditional watchdog groups are unable to acquire basic 
information regarding counterterrorism policy implementation because it is 
classified.  So rather than pinpointing specific problematic practices, these 
groups have drawn Congress’s attention to civil liberties concerns based 
only on statutory language.  Congress requested an audit of business-
records orders, for example, in response to concerns voiced by the 
American Library Association (ALA),128 which opposed allowing the 
government to access library records with these orders.  The ALA waged a 
campaign successful enough for the underlying provision to become known 
as “the library provision,” even though it can be used to acquire “any 
tangible thing.”129  But as of the first PATRIOT Act renewal, congressional 
 
 124. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 §§ 106A, 110, Pub. 
L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192. 
 125. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 124 (2007) [hereinafter 
2007 NSL REPORT], available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/natsec.pdf; OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS:  ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION OF NSL 
USAGE IN 2006, at 8–12 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 NSL REPORT], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE 
OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 64–78 
(2010) [hereinafter EXIGENT LETTER REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/s1001r.pdf (describing shortcuts used to acquire phone records). 
 126. 2007 NSL REPORT, supra note 125; 2008 NSL REPORT, supra note 125. See 
generally EXIGENT LETTER REPORT, supra note 125, at 64–78. 
 127. Letter from Richard A. Hertling, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., to Sen. Arlen Specter, 
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 2007), available at 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/doj_specterletter_030907.pdf.  See 
generally Dan Eggen & John Solomon, FBI Audit Prompts Calls for Reform; Some 
Lawmakers Suggest Limits on Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at A1. 
 128. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS 
63–64 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 SECTION 215 REPORT], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703a/final.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS 
RECORDS IN 2006, at 85 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 SECTION 215 REPORT], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf. 
 129. E.g., Dan Eggen, Library Challenges FBI Request; Patriot Act Prohibits Details of 
Lawsuit from Being Released, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2005, at A11. 
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inquiry revealed that this power had never been invoked to acquire library 
records.130  Instead, Congress discovered, libraries had voluntarily provided 
records to the government.131  Addressing the ALA’s true concerns would 
therefore require attention to voluntary information-sharing rules, an issue 
that garnered no attention in the reauthorization debates.  In other words, 
while sunsets were meant to prompt disclosure of information that would 
help Congress focus its legislative resources where they were most needed, 
they may have resulted in information that did the opposite. 
These examples illustrate the pitfalls that have interfered with sunsets’ 
ability to deliver their supposed information benefits.  Since the initial 
reauthorizations of the PATRIOT Act and the enactment of the FISA 
Amendments Act in 2005 and 2008 respectively, renewal debates have 
settled into a pattern.  Each time a deadline approaches, a handful of 
legislators raise the question of adding civil liberties protections—
sometimes delaying renewal—that would require a short-term renewal to 
allow additional negotiations or force legislative hearings.132  But 
ultimately, the expiring authorities are renewed, unchanged and with little, 
if any, additional information. 
4.  Irrelevance of Sunsets to Statutory Modifications 
Some might protest that sunsets cannot be portrayed as having failed 
entirely, because there have, in fact, been some meaningful modifications to 
statutes like the PATRIOT Act.  Upon closer examination, however, it is 
clear that all noncosmetic changes to these statutes have been prompted 
from sources outside of Congress.  For example, modifications of the rules 
governing the gag orders imposed on recipients of NSLs and business-
records orders, as well as both the definition of material support and the 
 
 130. See BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33332, USA 
PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005:  A LEGAL ANALYSIS 4 n.18 
(2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf (providing that as of the 
2005–06 reauthorization, the business-records-orders provision had never been used to 
access library records); Bendix & Quirk, supra note 63, at 32–33 (describing the highly 
effective lobbying by the American Libraries Association that prompted extensive debate 
over business-records orders).  This is likely due, at least in part, to the overuse of NSLs, 
which meant that the FBI secured information without a court order that it should have 
pursued via business-records orders. 
 131. 151 CONG. REC. 25,616 (2005) (statement of Rep. Scott). 
 132. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Democrats Put Off Some Difficult Issues Until 2010, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A33 (stating that renewal was included in a bill extending several 
expiring statutes); Paul Kane & Felicia Sonmez, Congress Extends PATRIOT Act 
Provisions, WASH. POST, May 27, 2011, at A4; Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden 
Places Hold on FISA Amendments Act Extension (June 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-places-hold-on-fisa-amendments-
act-extension; Felicia Sonmez, Senate Passes Short-term Extension of PATRIOT Act 
Provisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2011), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/02/
senate-to-vote-tuesday-on-shor.html (enacting ninety-day extension passed to allow 
additional debate and hearings, which relied on Administration witnesses for information 
regarding the value of the provisions at issue); see also supra notes 4–5 (noting the renewal 
of the FAA after votes defeated several amendments meant to enhance civil liberties). 
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scienter requirement necessary for material-support convictions, were 
compelled by judicial determinations that aspects of these provisions were 
unconstitutional.133 
Moreover, the presence of sunsets and the scrutiny of counterterrorism 
measures do not seem to be very closely correlated.  The NSL provision is 
perhaps the most obvious example—it has been among the most 
controversial and most frequently debated, but it has never been subject to a 
sunset.134  Nor has the PATRIOT Act provision authorizing sneak-and-peek 
searches.  Yet it garnered significant attention during the 2005 
reauthorization debates when Congress learned that less than one-in-five 
delayed-notice searches were related to terrorism investigations.  Between 
the enactment of the PATRIOT Act and its first sunset date, 155 of these 
“sneak-and-peek orders”—which FBI Director Robert Mueller described as 
“an invaluable tool to fight terrorism”—had been issued; eighteen of them 
had been used in terrorism cases.135  Leaving aside the cosmetic nature of 
the modification resulting from this scrutiny—the addition of a renewable 
thirty-day limit on the searches’ secrecy136—it was the result of information 
garnered about a provision that was not expiring.  And in 2011, the House 
of Representatives held hearings to discuss the permanent provisions of the 
PATRIOT Act.137  If long-term counterterrorism provisions are just as 
likely to be scrutinized as those subject to sunset, it is hard to attribute that 
scrutiny to the sunsets themselves. 
In sum, the passage of time does not seem to have resulted in legislative 
action free from bias, enlightened by information about policy 
implementation, and aimed at determining whether any excessive grant of 
power to the executive had outlived its usefulness.  The result is that 
changes to sunsetting counterterrorism legislation have been based on 
 
 133. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 115, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1992 (2006); see Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(describing a series of decisions by the Ninth Circuit holding that the statutory definition of 
“material support” was unconstitutionally vague, prompting Congress to amend); Doe v. 
Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 82 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding portions of the NSL gag-order 
provision unconstitutional), dismissed as moot by Doe II v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 420 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (holding that the government’s concession that newly enacted statutory 
procedures barred further litigation of plaintiffs’ claims rendered the appeal moot). 
 134. PATRIOT Act § 505, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (modifying NSLs 
but not imposing a sunset on the authority); see also Julian Sanchez, Leashing the 
Surveillance State:  How To Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities, CATO POL’Y 
ANALYSIS, no. 675 (May 16, 2011), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/
PA675.pdf. 
 135. USA PATRIOT Act:  A Review for the Purpose of Reauthorization, Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 36 (2005) (statement of Att’y Gen. Alberto 
Gonzales); Oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert Mueller III, Dir., FBI). 
 136. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 114(a)(1), 18 
U.S.C. § 3103a.  The original provision required the government to give notice of such a 
search “within a reasonable period.” PATRIOT Act § 213(b)(3), Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272. 
 137. See Permanent Provisions of the Patriot Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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incomplete or inaccurate information, largely symbolic, or difficult to 
attribute to the presence of the sunset.  In other words, hard-won sunset 
provisions have exhibited scant added policy-correction value.  The next 
part seeks to explain why the expectations for, and the reality of, sunsets 
diverge so markedly. 
II.  EXPLAINING COUNTERTERRORISM SUNSET PROVISIONS’ FAILURE 
The observed effects of sunset provisions are not inexplicable.  It is true 
that the argument for using sunsets in counterterrorism legislation makes 
intuitive sense.  It is also true that each of the factors that this argument 
relies upon—cognitive bias, information deficits, and the possible need for 
temporary measures—will be present when Congress considers post-crisis 
counterterrorism legislation.  But in presupposing that sunsets will generate 
renewal processes that result in policy correction, sunsets’ advocates 
assume that cognitive biases will subside, that Congress will gather—and 
use—new information, and that the need for these measures is actually 
viewed as finite.  But it appears that these assumptions are flawed.  
Moreover, they fail entirely to take into account the unique role the 
President plays in the formulation of counterterrorism policy.  As a result, 
counterterrorism legislation will be more resistant to modification or 
expiration than statutes subject to sunsets in other policy areas where initial, 
temporary legislation might be plagued by similar distorting factors. 
A.  Cognitive Bias 
The first characteristic of the post-crisis counterterrorism policymaking 
environment put forward to support the use of sunsets is the influence of 
cognitive bias.  Cognitive bias is a pattern of deviation in judgment that 
occurs in particular situations, leading to perceptual distortion or inaccurate 
judgment.138  In the post-crisis counterterrorism context, several forms of 
cognitive bias will lead individuals—legislators and constituents alike—to 
overestimate the risk posed by terrorism.139  People, for example, “consider 
risks to be significant if they can easily think of instances in which those 
risks came to fruition.”140  This phenomenon is triggered by particularly 
 
 138. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics & Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (describing several forms of bias). 
 139. See Gersen, supra note 26, at 268–71 (noting various cognitive biases that sunsets 
might help neutralize); Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 11–12) (same); cf. Oren Gross, 
Security vs. Liberty:  On Emotion and Cognition, in THE LONG DECADE:  HOW 9/11 HAS 
CHANGED THE LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–21), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952344 (discussing forms of cognitive bias that can affect 
security-related policy decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 133 (2003) (same). But see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY & THE COURTS 59–86 (2007) 
(questioning the impact of cognitive bias). 
 140. This phenomenon is referred to as the “availability heuristic.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 5 (2005); Sunstein, supra note 139, 
at 121 (discussing availability heuristic’s relevance to counterterrorism policymaking); see 
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. 
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salient and well-publicized risks, as well as risks that have recently 
produced actual harm, risks that conjure vivid images, and newly 
recognized or uncertain risks.141  These types of cognitively “available” 
risks are most likely to inspire legislation that reflects an overestimate of 
the likelihood of future harm.142 
A second source of risk overestimation is individuals’ tendency to focus 
on the most catastrophic possible outcome of a particular risk—on how bad 
the outcome could be, rather than on how likely that outcome is to come 
about.143  The effect of this form of bias is magnified when it comes to risks 
that produce strong emotional responses.144  Frightening but unlikely events 
thus stoke demand for governmental action. 
Finally, people would rather incur a certain loss than make a gamble 
likely to cost less than that certain loss but presenting a small probability of 
major loss.145  This results in individuals seeking “regulation, as a form of 
insurance, to prevent harms that are grave but that are highly unlikely to 
occur.”146  So “even if the likelihood of an attack is extremely low, people 
will be willing to pay a great deal to avoid it.”147  Sunsets’ proponents 
identify sunsets as a means of mitigating legislative missteps that result 
 
REV. 683, 706 (1999) (estimating risk on the basis of how easily examples can be brought to 
mind); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk 
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 754–55, 758 (1990) (same); Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 138, at 1127 (same). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Availability:  A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
207 (1973). 
 141. See Gersen, supra note 26, at 269–70; Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 10–11); see 
also SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 5–6, 36–39, 42–43 (“[M]any people are quite concerned 
about risks that appear newer, such as the risks associated with genetically modified foods, 
recently introduced chemicals, and terrorism.”); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 974 (2008) (“[T]here is a general 
tendency to favor new, high-profile risks for regulation over older, more familiar risks.”); 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 140, at 707 (people “grossly overestimate risks to which the 
media pay a great deal of attention”); Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution 
Against Terrorism, 9 J. RISK RES. 393, 413 (2006) (arguing that once a rare and catastrophic 
event has occurred, “people tend to overstate the risk of another catastrophic event”). 
 142. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 140, at 691–703 (providing examples). 
 143. This phenomenon is known as “probability neglect.” Sunstein, supra note 139, at 
126. 
 144. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 
YALE L.J. 61, 70–87 (2002) (describing the effect of probability neglect and providing 
evidence of its impact); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 127–30 (describing a regulation whose 
stringency can be attributed to “probability neglect when emotions are running high”); see 
also George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 271–74 
(2001) (discussing effects of emotion on risk assessment); Eric Posner, Fear and the 
Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 684 (2002) (noting 
that a fearful person “typically misperceives, or acts as though he misperceives, the 
magnitude” of a risk). 
 145. This tendency is labeled “prospect theory.” Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279–81 
(1979); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 140, at 707–08; Sunstein, supra note 139, at 123. 
 146. Noll & Krier, supra note 140, at 758 (“[L]arge catastrophic outcomes with low 
probabilities will be overvalued.”); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 123. 
 147. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 124. 
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from cognitive biases by delaying long-term policy commitments, 
ostensibly until any overreactions resulting from cognitive bias have 
dissipated.148 
The cognitive biases likely to lead to overreaction will be hard at work 
when it comes to terrorism.  Terrorist attacks are also subject to widespread 
publicity, conjure vivid images of damage and destruction, and are subject 
to great uncertainty with respect to when, where, and how an attack will 
occur.149  As such, they will be easily cognitively available.  It is also 
beyond cavil that terrorism can produce catastrophic harm.  This constant 
possibility of catastrophic “worst-case scenarios” means that cognitive bias 
will cause individuals to disregard the fact that the chances of incurring 
major harms are negligible.  Terrorism’s strong emotional component—as a 
phenomenon it “is unusual in that it possesses all of the characteristics that 
psychologists have shown to be conducive to disproportionate dread”—will 
exacerbate these effects.150  The presence of all of these features predicts 
that the cognitive bias will impact the policymaking environment in a 
terrorism emergency. 
Sunsets’ advocates assume that cognitive biases will dissipate within the 
sunset period, so that forcing reconsideration of legislation will counteract 
their effects.  A typical counterterrorism sunset period is around four years.  
Yet over a decade later, distorting effects of cognitive bias persist.151  One 
answer could be to extend the length of sunsets, allowing more time for the 
effects of biases to pass.  Perhaps if the United States was free from any 
terrorist attacks for, say, thirty years, the cognitive and emotional impact of 
the initial threat would dissipate entirely.  But if the point of a sunset is to 
prevent unnecessarily draconian statutes from becoming entrenched in the 
law, a thirty-year sunset is no remedy. 
The continuing cognitive impact of terrorism exceeds that of other policy 
areas because terrorism, as a risk, has several characteristics likely to 
promote cognitive bias over the long-term that are not present elsewhere.  
As an initial matter, terrorism will remain subject to more uncertainty than 
most risks that government addresses.  Researchers can develop vaccines 
 
 148. There are also cognitive biases that can lead to underregulation in certain 
circumstances. See Kysar, supra note 23, at 1049 (discussing several).  Each of these biases, 
however, will be significantly undermined by a terrorist attack that creates an atmosphere 
where existing regulations seem to have proved inadequate. 
 149. See Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 
567 (2006) (“[T]he availability heuristic suggests that we may be inclined to exaggerate the 
probability of further terrorist attacks.”); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Sacrificing Civil Liberties To Reduce Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99, 100 
(2003) (arguing that publicity of the 9/11 attacks “produced the kind of risk that people are 
likely to severely misestimate in the future”). 
 150. Stern & Wiener, supra note 141, at 414; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 81 
(describing how people will pay more for flight insurance covering losses resulting from 
“terrorism” than flight insurance covering all causes of loss); Gross, supra note 139 
(manuscript at 14) (noting that “alarmist narratives of worst-case scenario[s]” can undermine 
efforts for a restrained response to terrorism). 
 151. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (providing statistics of Americans 
who worry about terrorist attacks). 
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for a deadly virus; an outbreak of mad cow disease can be traced to its 
source; and precautions taken against an ongoing crime spree become 
unnecessary once the perpetrator is arrested.152  But additional time will 
bring only limited additional clarity to threats posed by terrorism. 
This is particularly true of ideology-driven terrorism in which the 
identification and incapacitation of individuals does not eliminate the 
risk.153  In 2001, America’s counterterrorism efforts were trained on Al 
Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the Taliban, and Osama 
Bin Laden.  Today, Al Qaeda is “a shadow of what it once was,”154 the 
Taliban have been removed from power in Afghanistan, and Osama Bin 
Laden is dead.  Current counterterrorism policy must address, for example, 
threats emanating from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and possibly from within the 
United States itself.  It is impossible to identify the nature of the threat that 
will present itself tomorrow.155  Continued uncertainty is likely to trigger 
continued overreaction. 
Another feature of terrorism contributing to long-term cognitive bias is 
the emotional element—and fear in particular—that compounds 
overestimation of easily accessible and potentially catastrophic risks.  This 
emotion is a permanent feature of the terrorist threat—terrorism is designed 
to instill fear—to a degree unparalleled by other contemporary risks.156 
Additional information about a threat usually helps abate fear of that threat.  
 
 152. See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 124 (using the D.C. sniper case as an example). 
 153. E.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 252 (2006) (a pattern has emerged 
whereby “radical cells learn from each attack and refine their operations, making preventive 
measures and police investigations more difficult” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Press 
Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Declassified Key Judgments of the National 
Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism:  Implications for the U.S.” (Apr. 2006), 
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2006%20
Press%20Releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf (“[T]he global jihadist movement 
. . . is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.”).  
 154. John O. Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The 
Efficacy & Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Int’l 
Ctr. for Scholars (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-
efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. 
 155. See The al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorist Threat:  An Appreciation of the Current 
Situation, Testimony Before the Canadian S. Special Comm. on Anti-terrorism 1 (Dec. 6, 
2010) (statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND Corp.), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2010/RAND_CT353.pdf (stating that analysts remain 
“remarkably divided in their assessments of where we are in the global campaign against al 
Qaeda-inspired terrorism,” “[i]ntelligence is imperfect,” and “[t]here is much uncertainty”); 
see also HOFFMAN, supra note 153, at 257–95 (speculating on the nature of future terrorist 
threats); Bruce Hoffman, The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, 
27 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 549, 552 (2004) (describing the evolution of Al Qaeda); 
Stern & Wiener, supra note 141, at 394 (noting that the sources of terrorism are “highly 
uncertain” and “difficult to assess”). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:  
RISK & RESPONSE 171–75 (2004) (finding that it is impossible to quantify the risk posed by 
terrorism). 
 156. See Stern & Wiener, supra note 141, at 414 (“Terrorism . . . is unusual in that it 
possesses all of the characteristics that psychologists have shown to be conducive to 
disproportionate dread.”). 
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But terrorism requires a “great deal of information” to counteract its 
emotional effects.157  So long as the possibility of terrorism remains, it will 
evoke emotions.  In fact, as terrorist groups continue to seek nuclear 
technology, fear of terrorism may rise. 
Another explanation for terrorism’s continuing cognitive impact is more 
mercenary.  A fearful public has specific beneficiaries.  The media, for 
example, benefit from extensive coverage of terrorist incidents, which 
incentivizes such coverage and, in turn, increases in the public both the 
“availability” of terrorism158 and the anxiety associated with the threat.159  
Executive officials also stand to gain from a sense of on-going threat;160 
when urging Congress to renew counterterrorism legislation, these officials 
emphasize the “continued threats to our Nation.”161  And elected officials 
can boost their approval numbers.  Studies during the 2004 presidential 
campaign, for example, showed that when people—liberal or 
conservative—were primed with images from 9/11, their approval of 
George W. Bush rose significantly.162 
Not only will cognitive biases caused by the crisis persist, but cognitive 
effects may result from the very act of reconsidering counterterrorism 
legislation.  When people are reminded about the 9/11 attacks, surveillance 
powers like those contained in the PATRIOT Act garner higher public 
support than they do at other times.163  And several post-9/11 studies show 
that after reminders of death—of which images and discussion of 9/11 or 
 
 157. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 127, 132; cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, 
Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 606 
(2001) (attributing policymaking errors to an inability to process information effectively). 
 158. See, e.g., Dominic Rohner & Bruno S. Frey, Blood and Ink!  The Common-Interest-
Game Between Terrorists and the Media, 133 PUB. CHOICE 129, 130 (2007) (noting that the 
media benefit from terrorism by increased sales and viewership); see also SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 140, at 102–03. 
 159. See, e.g., Michelle Slone, Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism, 44 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 515 (2000). 
 160. See infra Part II.C. 
 161. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 104 (noting the Bush Administration’s 
frequent references to 9/11 “as a way of emphasizing the reality of seemingly distant threats 
and the need to incur significant costs to counteract them”); Letter from J.M. McConnell, 
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Sen. Harry Reid (Feb. 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/docs/letter-ag-to-reid020508.pdf(stating that “in the face of 
the continued threats to our Nation from terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets, it is 
vital that Congress not allow” the executive’s surveillance authorities to expire). 
 162. Mark J. Landau et al., Deliver Us From Evil:  The Effects of Mortality Salience and 
Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush, 30 PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1136, 1142, 1144–48 (2004) (describing President Bush’s use of images of 
9/11 in 2004 election campaign ads to establish his effectiveness in combating terrorism and 
noting that his “popularity [was] increased when thoughts of death or terrorism are 
especially salient”); see Florette Cohen et al., American Roulette:  The Effect of Reminders of 
Death on Support for George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential Election, 5 ANALYSES SOC. 
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 177, 185 (2005) (attributing Bush’s “victory in the 2004 presidential 
election” to “the appeal of his leadership style . . . to an electorate that was continually 
reminded of the trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks”). 
 163. See Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Preventing Terrorism After the 9/11 Attacks, 71 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 142, 160 (2007). 
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future attacks are of course examples—people will exhibit more 
nationalistic tendencies, disapproval of people different from themselves, 
and increased aggression toward those who do not share their cultural 
worldview, making counterterrorism measures whose burdens fall on 
segments of the population seen as “other” more palatable.164 
A possible example of a continued tendency to overstate the threat comes 
in the context of so-called “homegrown” Islamic terrorism.  A chorus of 
voices in late 2010 and early 2011 stressed the significant and growing 
threat posed by radicalized American Muslims.165  The result was a series 
of congressional hearings, proposed legislation, White House strategy 
development, and widespread alarm expressed in the media.166  While the 
threat from this front is a real one, recent studies indicate that the scale of 
homegrown terrorism “does not appear to have corroborated the warnings 
issued by government officials” in early 2011.167  In fact, instead of the 
“surge” predicted by government officials, the numbers of Muslim 
Americans involved in terrorist-related activities dropped in 2011.168  But 
public dialogue has failed to devote attention to this revised threat 
 
 164. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 209; Cohen et al., supra note 162, at 178; 
Landau et al., supra note 162, at 1139. See generally Tom Pyszczynski et al., Mortality 
Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might:  The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil, 32 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 525 (2006) (noting that mortality salience made 
conservatives more likely to support the use of political violence as well as the PATRIOT 
Act itself). 
 165. See, e.g., PETER BERGEN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., ASSESSING 
THE TERRORIST THREAT:  A REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S NATIONAL 
SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GROUP 1, 31 (2010) (concluding that the “increasingly prominent 
role” that U.S. citizens and residents have played in terrorist plots indicates a “domestic 
terrorism problem”); Lucy Madison, Attorney General Eric Holder:  Threat of Homegrown 
Terrorism “Keeps Me Up at Night,” CBSNEWS (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20026288-503544.html; Dina Temple-Raston, 
Homegrown Terrorists Pose Biggest Threat, Report Says, NPR (Sept. 10, 2010, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129760267; Jordy Yager, Napolitano 
Warns of Threat from Homegrown Radicalization, Terrorism, HILL (Feb. 9 2011, 7:00 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/143127-napolitano-warns-lawmakers-of-threat-from-
homegrown-radicalization-domestic-terrorism. 
 166. See, e.g., Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act, H.R. 
1955, 110th Cong. (2007); The Evolving Nature of Terrorism:  Nine Years After the 9/11 
Attacks, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. (2010); WHITE 
HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local
_partners.pdf. 
 167. CHARLES KURZMAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11, at 1 
(2012). See generally id. at 7 (noting that repeated warnings about the threat of homegrown 
terrorism from government officials creates “a sense of heightened tension that is out of 
proportion to the actual number of terrorist attacks”); Risa A. Brooks, Muslim 
“Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States:  How Serious is the Threat?, 36 INT’L SEC. 7, 
10 (2011) (concluding that Muslim Americans are not “increasingly motivated or capable of 
engaging in terrorist attacks”). 
 168. KURZMAN, supra note 167, at 8.  In addition, the domestic perpetrators who do exist 
might be less dangerous than expected.  Individuals who have studied specific instances of 
domestic terrorism in detail have described the would-be terrorists as “incompetent, 
ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, . . . amateurish, dopey, 
. . . moronic, irrational, [or] foolish.” Mueller & Stewart, supra note 83, at 88. 
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assessment.  Instilling and sustaining fear makes for compelling headlines.  
Walking back sensational claims and diffusing alarm is more difficult and 
less profitable. 
This persistence of at least some cognitive bias in the counterterrorism 
policymaking environment might provide a partial explanation for sunsets’ 
failure to ensure reconsideration of a policy after “temporary passions” have 
abated.  While they will almost certainly fade to some degree, the 
dispassionate deliberative capacity of both lawmakers and citizens will 
remain partially compromised, prompting them to place disproportionate 
value on counterterrorism efforts perceived to ward off terrorist attacks. 
B.  Information Deficits 
Those who advocate for the use of sunset provisions in counterterrorism 
legislation place great weight on their potential informational benefits.169  
They point out that, when lack of information limits Congress’s ability to 
evaluate an issue fully, sunset clauses “can improve the body of information 
on which decision-making is grounded.”170 
There are two types of potential information deficits for sunsets to 
address.  First, it is possible that there simply is no information either about 
a risk’s characteristics or about the viability of a particular measure to 
mitigate that risk.  In 2001, for example, there was scant basis for Congress 
to predict whether any security benefits that the PATRIOT Act provided 
would be worth their costs.  But once a given counterterrorism power has 
been used for a time, “[b]etter information becomes available,”171 and 
policymaking undertaken when more information is available “increases the 
probability of selecting optimal policy.”172  On this view, sunsets should 
afford Congress the ability to reassess policy after it has had the opportunity 
to collect sufficient information for effective evaluation. 
Second, it may be that information exists but that Congress lacks access 
to that information and therefore cannot incorporate it into the 
policymaking process.  In this circumstance, there is a different way in 
which sunsets might help.  When a sunset approaches, the executive branch 
must convince Congress to renew the authority that was created by the 
sunsetting provision.  This provides Congress with leverage that allows its 
members to demand information from the executive.173  The legislature can 
then use that information to inform its renewal decisions. 
 
 169. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 26, at 266–78; Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 10, 16–
17); supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics:  
The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 
562–63 (1998) (noting that sunsets can institutionalize legislative evaluation of information 
regarding tax expenditures); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE 
L.J. 480, 534 (2008) (arguing that sunsets are a means of incorporating learning into the 
legislative process). 
 170. Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 10). 
 171. Id. (manuscript at 10, 16). 
 172. Gersen, supra note 26, at 267. 
 173. Id. at 276–78, 282; Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 17). 
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But the value of sunsets in erasing information deficits rests on 
assumptions both that Congress will gain access to information allowing for 
better legislative decisions and that it will in fact put that information to 
use.174  Neither of these assumptions has proved true in reauthorization 
debates, undermining sunsets’ ability to deliver the information benefits 
envisioned for them.175 
Secrecy is at the root of this problem, which has three manifestations.  
First, the mere fact that the work of counterterrorism itself is conducted 
largely in secret and often involves classified information that is illegal—
and frequently damaging to national security—to disseminate or disclose 
places Congress and the public at the informational mercy of the 
executive.176  Information about policies—their costs, how they are 
implemented, whether they are effective, and even their content—must 
come from the same entity implementing those policies and requesting their 
renewal.  If Congress does not receive (or cannot share) information 
regarding policies subject to sunset, any debates over reauthorization will 
suffer from the same information deficits that, in part, inspired the use of 
sunsets in the first place.  Second, the dearth of public information means 
that, as a sunset approaches, Congress cannot rely (as it is wont to do) on 
interested parties outside the government to expose wasteful, ineffective, or 
abusively implemented aspects of the expiring policies.  Its traditional 
oversight role is thus rendered more challenging.  And finally, Congress 
itself is less aggressive than it could be in seeking out the information it 
requires. 
1.  Clandestine Nature of Counterterrorism Activities 
The executive’s information monopoly means that at times Congress 
simply does not know about certain executive activity, and therefore does 
not know that there is information it should ask for.177  As one former 
senator noted, executive officials “answer your questions, but you have to 
ask the right questions.”178  At other times the executive is merely slow to 
respond to information requests.  Recall the Attorney General’s reluctance 
to share information in the early days of the PATRIOT Act or divulge facts 
 
 174. See Gersen, supra note 26, at 275–77. See generally id. (recognizing that the 
information-based justification for sunsets’ use is undermined if “temporary statutes are 
always extended with little deliberation”). 
 175. See supra Part I.C. 
 176. The impact of this secrecy is compounded by the fact that significant amounts of 
information that is classified need not be. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. 
SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR., REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 5 
(2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/LNS/
Brennan_Overclassification_Final.pdf (noting longstanding, bipartisan agreement that as 
much as 50 percent of classified information is improperly classified). 
 177. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (describing this phenomenon during the Bush 
Administration). 
 178. Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST, Apr. 
27, 2004, at A1. 
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about the Terrorist Surveillance Program.179  As sunsets approach, this 
reluctance sometimes gives way—some legislators believed that once 
Congress began to use the PATRIOT Act’s sunset to “[hold] the 
Administration’s feet to the fire”180 about how it was “being 
implemented,”181 they “got real answers.”182  Others remained unsatisfied, 
pointing out that some of the provisions that Congress converted into 
lasting legislation were “untested,” and Congress could not evaluate “how 
helpful they are because the President has not provided information.”183 
Another byproduct of the executive information monopoly is that 
Congress lacks the means to verify the information it does get.  Instead, 
Congress must rely on communications from executive officials.  
Information regarding the number of NSLs issued is the most concrete 
example.  The Justice Department inadvertently misreported the numbers, 
but as Congress had no independent means of verifying those reports, it was 
unaware of the error until the Inspector General released his report years 
later.184  But this handicap is even more glaring with respect to evaluating 
the effectiveness—as opposed to frequency of usage—of counterterrorism 
powers.  The conclusions set forth in the few Inspector General reports 
about the efficacy of counterterrorism powers seem to have rested largely 
on the claims of intelligence officials, describing NSLs, for example, as 
“indispensable investigative tools.”185  And the most a joint Inspector 
General’s report about the value of the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
could say was that many senior intelligence officials “believe that the 
[program] filled a gap in intelligence collection.”186  Lacking a system to 
measure counterterrorism policy’s effectiveness, Congress has had nothing 
but the executive branch’s assurances regarding both how particular 
programs were being implemented and what value those programs had. 
Frequent instances in which information is disclosed to only a limited 
group of legislators also pose particular challenges.  The executive is 
 
 179. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. See generally Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy:  Who Controls Information in the National Security 
State? 14–16 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-53, 
2010) (discussing instances of executive withholding information). 
 180. 151 CONG. REC. 16,934 (2005) (statement of Rep. Levin). 
 181. Id. 
 182. 151 CONG. REC. 25,616 (statement of Rep. Scott); see also 154 CONG. REC. 1270 
(2008) (statement of Sen. Cardin). 
 183. 151 CONG. REC. 16,903 (statement of Rep. Thompson); see also 155 CONG. REC. 
22,086 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (stating that during the PATRIOT Act 
reauthorization debate in 2005, much “implementation information remained classified”); 
151 CONG. REC. 16,931 (statement of Rep. DeLauro) (“We are failing to consider some of 
the most ineffective and overreaching provisions of the PATRIOT Act.”); 151 CONG. REC. 
16,927 (statement of Rep. Pelosi) (“[W]e have not seen that oversight.”). 
 184. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 185. 2007 NSL REPORT, supra note 125, at xlvi; see also 2008 SECTION 215 REPORT, 
supra note 128, at 55–58. See generally 2007 SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 128. 
 186. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIA, NSA, 
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 37–38 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf. 
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statutorily obligated to keep Congress “fully and currently informed” of the 
intelligence activities of the United States.187  With respect to certain secret 
government activity, only the “chairmen and ranking minority members of 
the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader 
of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership 
as may be included by the President”188—known as the Gang of Eight—are 
included in briefings.  Sometimes these members may neither bring staff 
with them to the briefings nor consult staff about what they learn.  In a 
handwritten letter to Vice President Richard Cheney, Senator Rockefeller, a 
member of the Senate’s intelligence committee, complained about a 
briefing at which he was informed about the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program, stating that, as neither a “technician nor an attorney,” his 
“inability to consult staff or counsel” left him “unable to fully evaluate, 
much less endorse these activities [discussed at the briefing].”189 
Even if all members of Congress are fully informed, the usefulness of 
that information in considering whether to reauthorize policies carried out 
in secret is significantly impaired by the fact that the public will be unable 
to play a meaningful role.  This was a problem with respect to the debates 
over codifying the Terrorist Surveillance Program, in which “critical legal 
and factual information remained unknown to the public.”190  The secret 
interpretation of the business-records provision presents a similar issue.191  
It hardly needs to be stated that, if the government’s interpretation of a 
provision differs significantly from the public’s understanding of it, an 
informed public debate about whether the law should be renewed is 
rendered impossible.  Absent knowledge of what the government is doing 
in its name, the public has no means of determining whether to support 
renewal of existing legislation, press for policy changes, or advocate 
allowing the legislation to expire.  And without public pressure acting as an 
exogenous mechanism pressing Congress to incorporate lessons learned 
into the renewal legislation, Congress is likely to defer to the executive in 
this area.192  The value of any information is sharply reduced when it 
cannot be employed in an open, public debate over the desirability of the 
policy. 
 
 187. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)(1) (2006). 
 188. Id. § 413b(c)(2).  There is a credible argument that only briefings regarding covert 
actions, and not intelligence programs, should be limited to the Gang of Eight. Compare id. 
(no mention of limited briefings), with 50 U.S.C. § 413a (authorization of limited briefings). 
 189. Letter from Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV to Vice President Dick Cheney (July 17, 
2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/12/rock121905.pdf; see also Kathleen 
Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 932–
36 (critiquing Gang of Eight briefings as a means of inoculating the executive from backlash 
without providing Congress a meaningful oversight opportunity). 
 190. 155 CONG. REC. 22,086 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 191. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 192. See infra Part II.D. 
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2.  Impact on Congressional Oversight 
Government officials, outside task forces, and scholars consistently 
criticize congressional oversight of national security policy as 
ineffective.193  Sunsets might enhance oversight in certain ways (such as 
providing leverage for demanding information), but secrecy undermines the 
efficacy of one of Congress’s most efficient oversight models—known as 
“fire alarm” oversight. 
In fire-alarm oversight, Congress relies on nongovernmental parties to 
identify problematic policies and ensure that legislators are informed about 
all sides of an issue.194  This eliminates the need for Congress itself to 
spend the time and resources necessary to identify, gather, or analyze 
crucial information.  Instead, interested parties will bring to Congress’s 
attention matters of concern regarding ongoing government action (or 
inaction).  This may be true when it comes to things such as adverse health 
effects caused by a drug treatment approved by the FDA, or an industrial 
plant’s pollution of waterways in violation of the Clean Water Act.  The 
same cannot be said for counterterrorism policy, because interested parties 
lack access to the information that might “set off” a fire alarm.195  They can 
therefore neither provide that information to Congress nor identify specific 
concerns about how a sunsetting provision has been implemented. 
Almost as troubling, the veil of secrecy can trigger false alarms—issues 
about which interested parties do raise concerns may not direct Congress 
toward the best use of its oversight resources.  The time spent on appeasing 
fears in 2005 regarding the use of business-records orders to collect 
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widespread dissatisfaction with congressional oversight among both members and their 
staff); AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES 31 (2011) (stating intelligence community officials 
and their legislative overseers both believe “that oversight was consistently ineffective and 
getting more so”); Vicki Divoll, The “Full Access Doctrine”:  Congress’s Constitutional 
Entitlement to National Security Information from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 493, 539–41 (2011) (arguing for intelligence oversight reform because “[f]orty years 
of tweaking the [existing] statutes has not worked”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President 
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 
1255, 1297–1305 (1988); Loch K. Johnson, Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and 
Guardians:  Role Selection by Congressional Intelligence Overseers, 28 SAIS REV. INT’L 
AFF. 93, 104–06 (2008) (calling on members of Congress to exercise more vigilant 
intelligence oversight). 
 194. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked:  Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 167–68 (1984) 
(contrasting fire-alarm oversight with more time-consuming and expensive “police-patrol” 
oversight). 
 195. See AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND 
NSC 26–28 (1999) (“[I]t is difficult for interest groups to serve as low-cost information 
providers.”); Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 597 
n.81 (2010) (noting that fire-alarm oversight “typically depends on a public that is positioned 
to observe official actors and to call attention to their potential abuses”); see also Schulhofer, 
supra note 179, at 21–30 (describing challenges to congressional oversight stemming from 
secrecy). 
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information about Americans’ reading habits may have been better spent 
elsewhere, given that the power had not been used for that purpose. 
3.  Congressional Efforts to Acquire Information 
The inherent secrecy surrounding counterterrorism efforts is not the only 
force contributing to persistent information deficits in policymaking.  
Congress has not maximized the potential of the leverage that sunsets 
provide to secure the release of helpful information.  Without public access 
to the relevant information, there is neither the stick of public disapproval 
prompting Congress to engage in aggressive oversight nor the carrot of 
claiming credit for repairing flawed policy.196 
Congress’s demand that the Justice Department prepare more searching 
reviews of the use of business-records orders and NSLs once those 
provisions had come under attack, and the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
persistence in seeking information regarding the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program, indicate that it is in legislators’ power to secure helpful 
information.  But only NSLs and business-records orders were subject to 
such audits—and even those only for the years 2002 to 2006.197  So while 
the information the audits provided was available for the 2009 
reauthorization debates, that information was incomplete—failing to cover 
2007 and 2008 or to provide information regarding anything other than 
those two tools—and provided for no comparable information for future 
reauthorizations.  Rather than secure these more probing examinations of 
effectiveness or signs of abuse or waste, Congress’s information requests 
and reporting requirements are limited to more opaque or symbolic 
forms.198  This approach threatens to consume significant executive branch 
time and resources—the price tag for one recent biannual report required by 
the PATRIOT Act came in at $647,179 for the six-month reporting 
period199—to generate reports that fall short of facilitating searching 
assessments of the nation’s counterterrorism machinery. 
So whether it is because Congress does not actively seek enough—or the 
correct—information, because the executive fails to supply that 
information, or because the necessarily secret nature of counterterrorism 
 
 196. See, e.g., ZEGART, supra note 193, at 63–64 (congressional motives discourage 
intelligence oversight); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security 
Activities:  Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2008) 
(concluding that congresspersons may acquiesce in, or even facilitate, executive 
noncompliance with statutory directives to share information); Rascoff, supra note 195, at 
597 (stating that congressional intelligence committee members are “poorly incentivized to 
question intelligence practices” of questionable legality); Schulhofer, supra note 179, at 24 
(noting lack of political rewards resulting from intelligence community oversight); Schwartz, 
supra note 95, at 428 (describing reports to Congress as “a myth of oversight”). 
 197. USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 119(a), Pub. 
L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
 198. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 199. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF § 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 18 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0908.pdf. 
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policy renders meaningful debate impossible, renewal debates about 
counterterrorism statutes have not reflected the benefits sunsets might 
provide in less clandestine contexts.  Instead, the fact that the work of 
counterterrorism goes on largely behind closed doors means that sunsets’ 
purported information-generating benefits have proved largely illusory. 
This inevitable persistent information deficit is the feature that most 
starkly differentiates counterterrorism policy from other policymaking 
areas.  To be sure, information deficits also plague long-term policymaking 
and the ability to craft risk regulation for newly discovered risks in the 
nonterrorism context.  But to the extent that sunsets rely on the ability to 
eliminate congressional information deficits during the sunset period, that 
faith is misplaced.  The heart of the sunset mechanism is the idea that 
additional congressional deliberation will improve policy.  But if sunsets 
are meant to allow Congress to reform policy based on the benefit of new 
information, the assumption that Congress will have and use new 
information is integral to the very concept of sunsets.  When Congress is 
perpetually underinformed because it is not in charge of the relevant 
information, and interested parties outside the government cannot fill this 
gap, legislators cannot expect sunsets to succeed. 
C.  The Myth of Temporary Legislation 
The third way in which sunsets are hailed as valuable is as a tool to 
address “temporary” crises.200  If the period requiring a particular measure 
is finite, a statute that returns by default to the status quo at the end of that 
period avoids the need for Congress to repeal the measure.201  In other 
words, sunsets can be a “symmetric response to policy problems that are 
themselves perceived to be temporary.”202  The assumption that temporary 
legislation will be permitted to expire when it is no longer necessary—and 
that this point will be evident—underlies this argument. 
Throughout American history, this is in fact the way that the U.S. 
government has responded to emergencies.  In contrast to many nations,203 
the U.S. Constitution does not establish a regime of emergency powers to 
activate in the event of a crisis.204  Instead, emergency powers at the 
American executive’s disposal frequently result from legislative delegations 
of power triggered by some form of perceived need.  These delegations 
often purport to provide “emergency power” on a temporary basis and 
 
 200. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 23, at 1060, 1067 n.253 (stating that one of the 
“acceptable uses of temporary legislation is when lawmakers originally intend the legislation 
to be temporary”). 
 201. Cf. Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 9–10) (describing this position to advocate for 
use of sunset provisions in counterterrorism legislation). 
 202. Gersen, supra note 26, at 273. 
 203. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 30, at 213; Samuel Issacharoff, Political 
Safeguards in Democracies at War, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 201 (2009). 
 204. The Suspension Clause, which permits Congress to suspend the “the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus . . . when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,” is an 
exception. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 1814 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
expire either of their own force or when one of the political branches 
declares the emergency at an end.205 
As an initial matter, sunsets can only serve this purpose if the need for 
the legislation at issue truly is conceived of as finite.  It is far from clear that 
this is the case with respect to the post-9/11 counterterrorism surveillance 
statutes.206  To the extent that legislators never meant to allow any of these 
measures to expire, it means that at least one of the claimed purposes of 
sunsets was doomed to fail from the start.  But even crisis legislation that is 
truly intended to be temporary tends to “normalize” and become part of the 
legal fabric. 
1.  Temporary Powers and Normalization 
Numerous scholars have documented the phenomenon of temporary 
emergency powers normalizing over time, gradually becoming part of the 
accepted body of law.207  This is a phenomenon that has occurred across the 
globe and at all levels of government.208  And it represents a formidable 
force pressing against reconsideration of counterterrorism measures enacted 
in the wake of an attack. 
Circumstances like the United States’ struggle against terrorism, where 
emergency and normalcy become difficult to distinguish from one another, 
render this normalization trend even more powerful.209  As commentators 
and officials from all three branches of government have noted, the “war on 
 
 205. E.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 
1625 (1977) (authorizing the President to block financial transactions and freeze assets after 
declaring the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” that originates “outside the 
United States”). 
 206. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 207. See, e.g., David Cole, No Reason To Believe:  Radical Skepticism, Emergency 
Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1354 (2008) (reviewing 
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY & THE 
COURTS (2007)); Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 30, at 219, 234 (noting that legislated 
emergency powers can become “embedded in the normal legal system”). 
 208. See, e.g., DONOHUE, supra note 27, at 14–16 (United Kingdom); GROSS & NI 
AOLÁIN, supra note 1, 171–244 (providing examples of the spread and routinization of 
emergency powers); Oren Gross, What “Emergency” Regime?, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 74, 75 
(2006) (Israel); Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities:  Human Rights, Terrorism, and 
Security Law in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 125–41 (2006) (India); Chris Mooney, A 
Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 67–68 (state agencies). See 
generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONVICTED BEFORE TRIAL:  INDEFINITE DETENTION 
UNDER MALAYSIA’S EMERGENCY ORDINANCE (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/malaysia0806/malaysia0806web.pdf (Malaysia). 
 209. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME:  AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 4–5 
(2012) (arguing that wartime has become normal time in America); Oren Gross, Chaos and 
Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 
1022, 1085, 1089–90 (2003) (arguing that “the exception[—the state of emergency and the 
concomitant emergency regime—]has merged with the rule”); see also Continuation of the 
National Emergency With Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,633 (Sept. 
9, 2011) (reauthorizing of the state of emergency declared in 2001 for the tenth time). 
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terror” has no ascertainable end.210  Including a sunset provision to prevent 
normalization of legislation presumes the existence of a finite crisis that 
demands extraordinary measures adopted for its duration—a deadly virus 
might need to be quarantined, but it will pass; mad cow disease will be 
eradicated; floodwaters will recede.  It is the ascertainable onset of the crisis 
that prompts the invocation of emergency measures, and the ascertainable 
end that allows emergency measures to be discontinued.  If an emergency 
will not end but at best will recede incrementally, it is difficult to determine 
when the threat has faded sufficiently to discontinue measures enacted to 
address it.211  To do so, legislators must make the subjective determination 
that the threat has faded to the point that these tools no longer serve to 
reduce risk.212 
Another factor contributing to the normalization process is that the 
security measures adopted to thwart terrorists tend to migrate into 
nonterrorism law enforcement operations.213  Measures justified in 2001 as 
“constructive, valuable tools to be used in the fight against terrorism”214 are 
now used to investigate “drug traffickers, white-collar criminals, 
blackmailers, child pornographers, money launderers, spies and even 
corrupt foreign leaders.”215  Delayed-notice search warrants are one such 
power—at the time of the initial PATRIOT Act reauthorization debates, just 
18 of 155 such warrants were issued in terrorism cases.216  This trend has 
only become more dramatic over time.  From October 2007 to September 
2010, 4,217 sneak-and-peek warrants were issued, but less than 1 percent of 
 
 210. E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (recognizing that the fight 
against terrorism “may last a generation or more”); 151 CONG. REC. 16,924 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Wilson) (“The war against foreign terrorists and spies will not end.”); 
John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 816 (2004) 
(arguing that the unending nature of the U.S. struggle against terrorism creates a perpetual 
state of emergency); Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 81, 82 (Jan. 20, 2004) (noting that the hope that the danger is behind 
us “is understandable, comforting—and false”). 
 211. In a somewhat analogous example from American history, a federal rent control 
statute for the District of Columbia was enacted with a two-year sunset in the wake of World 
War I as an “emergency” measure to address the influx of would-be tenants into Washington 
and the accompanying rise in demand for housing. Act of October 22, 1919, ch. 80, tit. II, 41 
Stat. 298.  Twice it was renewed, and it only ceased to have effect when a federal court held 
the law invalid because the emergency on which it relied had ended. Vermeule, supra note 
26, at 167–68. 
 212. See DONOHUE, supra note 27, at 14. 
 213. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 88–179 (2003) (describing multiple examples of 
this phenomenon from American history); Laura Donohue, The Perilous Dialogue, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 357, 373–77 (2009) (describing the spread of measures initially aimed at 
terrorist violence in Northern Ireland first to the rest of Great Britain and then to all areas of 
criminal law); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 605, 621 (2003) (describing the theory that terrorism powers bleed over into regular 
policing). 
 214. See Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 19 (2001) (statement of Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft). 
 215. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law To Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al; see Gross, supra note 208, at 80–82. 
 216. See supra note 135. 
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them related to terrorism.217  Once an investigative tool has been used 
successfully against, for example, a major drug distribution organization, 
Congress will find it difficult to repeal the power—regardless of whether 
less intrusive tools might have led to the same result. 
2.  Bureaucratic Entrenchment 
Features inherent in bureaucracies—and in national security 
bureaucracies in particular—are also major contributors to the 
normalization tendency.  Any change in the way a bureaucracy operates 
represents not just a change of text in the statute books; it also often entails 
substantial institutional transformation.  Any time an agency’s powers or 
priorities change, that shift necessitates concrete actions.  In response to 
post-9/11 counterterrorism statutes, agencies drafted and distributed new 
handbooks, guidelines, and manuals reflecting the modifications.  
Government officials were trained in how to implement the new policies.  
New personnel were hired, new equipment was installed, new databases 
were created, new paperwork designed, new procedures devised.  Once 
these changes have been made, and once employees have become 
accustomed to the new rules and expectations, it is no small task to 
unscramble the egg.218 
The agency’s substantive work adjusts as well.  Once the FBI had the 
authority to collect subscriber information from Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) without a judicial order, its agents came to rely heavily on this 
tool.219  This creates a path dependence in which investigative strategies 
rely upon the ability to use this tool—indeed, this power has been described 
as “the building blocks of most [national security] investigations.”220  If the 
power never had been granted in the first place, perhaps the Bureau would 
have found a different way to achieve its goals—after all, investigators 
blame the 9/11 “failures” on lack of communication and leadership, not the 
 
 217. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS 
(2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aousc_patriot_act_section_213_sneak_
and_peek_report.pdf; REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND 
EXTENSIONS (2010), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2009rept.pdf; 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON 
APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS (2009), available 
at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SneakAndPeakReport.pdf. 
 218. See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 169, at 524 (“The greater the sunk costs described 
here, the stronger the power of policy inertia.”). 
 219. See 2007 NSL REPORT, supra note 125, at 45–65. 
 220. The Permanent Provisions of the Patriot Act, Hearing Before H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) 
(statement of Todd Hinnen, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen. for National Security). 
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absence of necessary intelligence-collection powers.221  But long-standing 
reliance on a particular tool raises the value of that tool in the user’s eyes. 
Add to these procedural and strategic considerations the fact that 
additional powers are accompanied by additional funding and prestige, and 
officials will resist efforts to repeal the powers.  The intelligence 
community has become a leviathan, accustomed to operating with fewer 
limitations, bigger budgets, and more clout than ever before222—a position 
it is predictably loath to cede.  In the counterterrorism context, this means 
that military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies will lobby against 
efforts to roll back powers they have been granted.223  As “beneficiaries of 
an extant regulatory program,” these organizations “will lobby harder” than 
those who advocate modifications.224 
These considerations can apply with some force to any bureaucracy, but 
they are exacerbated here in at least two ways.  First, in most regulatory 
contexts, there are strong, established interests opposed to agency assertions 
of power.  For example, industry will resist EPA efforts to impose more 
stringent environmental regulations.  In the counterterrorism context, 
however, the executive and the established interests all favor maximizing 
the executive’s “regulatory” power.  Conferring additional powers on the 
executive branch benefits the agencies themselves.  And, again, the entity 
pressing for continued powers is the only entity with full access to the 
information about the costs and benefits of those powers.  But private 
contractors that supply these agencies with hardware, software, and 
personnel also profit, as do the telecommunications companies and ISPs 
who charge for every wiretap.225  And second, the same pressure that 
Congress faces to maximize the nation’s security and to avoid criticism for 
not having taken sufficient preventive measures226 provides the executive 
strong incentives to continually assert and consolidate power in this area.227 
 
 221. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 193, at 269–76, 424–27; COMM’N ON THE 
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 281–82 (2005), available at. 
 222. See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security, Inc., WASH. POST, 
July 20, 2010, at A1 (stating that “there is a Top Secret America created since 9/11 that is 
hidden from public view, lacking in thorough oversight and so unwieldy that its 
effectiveness is impossible to determine”). 
 223. See DONOHUE, supra note 27, at 15. 
 224. See Kysar, supra note 23, at 1047–48; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 157, at 603–
05 (attributing the “stickiness” of some policies to cognitive effects such as loss aversion and 
the endowment effect). 
 225. See Dan Eggen, Wiretaps Are Cut Over Unpaid Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2008, at 
A15 (reporting that telecommunications companies have “repeatedly cut off FBI access to 
wiretaps of alleged terrorists” due to unpaid bills). 
 226. See infra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 227. See, e.g., Philip Mudd, Former Deputy Dir., FBI, Nat’l Sec. Branch, Brennan Center 
for Justice Panel Discussion on Intelligence Collection and Law Enforcement:  New Roles, 
New Challenges (Mar. 18, 2011) (transcript on file with author) (describing executive 
officials’ recognition that failure to act preventatively will result in congressional 
investigations and finger-pointing). 
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D.  The Role of the President in Counterterrorism Policymaking 
One crucial element of any discussion of counterterrorism powers goes 
unaddressed in the accounts of legislators and commentators who favor 
sunsets:  the President dominates the formulation of national security and 
foreign affairs policy in ways that he does not in any other policy area.  
This domination arises from many sources, including the drastic expansion 
of presidential power in the post-war era, which is most highly pronounced 
in the national security context;228 the advantage that accompanies the 
President’s position as first mover in responding to crises; the ability to act 
quickly and secretly; the President’s role as the “sole organ” of U.S. foreign 
affairs;229 the executive’s information monopoly; substantive expertise in 
military and security matters; and a norm of executive primacy that fosters 
expectations that the President will take the lead in national security.230 
The President also has at his disposal the bully pulpit, and executive 
officials have not shied away from using it to press for desired 
counterterrorism powers.  In the rush to enact the original PATRIOT Act in 
2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted that individuals who 
“scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty” would “only aid 
terrorists.”231  These sorts of warnings of potential catastrophe were not 
limited to the immediate post-9/11 timeframe.  When Congress was 
debating the FISA Amendments Act in 2007, President Bush admonished 
legislators that each “day that Congress puts off reforms increases the 
danger to our nation.”232  And in urging renewal of that Act, President 
Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder recently joined with the Director of 
National Intelligence in telling Congress that the expiring authorities 
“continue[] to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the 
nation.”233 
 
 228. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1816–21 
(1996) (summarizing accretion of power in the presidency). 
 229. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 230. See DONOHUE, supra note 27, at 262 (arguing that congressional reticence to engage 
in aggressive oversight might stem from a belief that surveillance is an exclusively executive 
power); ZEGART, supra note 195, at 28–36 (noting that “presidents play a larger role” in 
shaping national security agencies); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential 
Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–19 (2008) 
(enumerating reasons for the continuous expansion of presidential power); see also POSNER 
& VERMEULE, supra note 139, at 47 (arguing that Congress defers to executive policy 
preferences because it recognizes its institutional disadvantages in responding to 
emergencies). 
 231. Ashcroft:  Critics of New Terror Measures Undermine Effort, CNN.COM (Dec. 6, 
2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-12-06/us/inv.ashcroft.hearing_1_military-tribunals-
terrorism-probe-attorney-general-john-ashcroft?_s=PM:US. 
 232. Jim Rutenberg, Wielding the Threat of Terrorism, Bush Outmaneuvers the 
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A14 (reporting that Senate Democrats convinced 
President Bush to delete that sentence from the public radio address on July 28, 2007). See 
generally Tim Starks, Bush Signs FISA Rewrite into Law, CONG. Q. WKLY., July 14, 2008 
(reporting that President Bush had “chastised” Congress for not sending him a bill to sign). 
 233. Letter from James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, and Att’y Gen. Eric Holder 
to Reps. John Boehner and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives, and Sens. Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell, Majority and Minority 
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The practical impact of Presidential dominance is a marked legislative 
deference to executive branch requests, not only initially but when it comes 
time for renewal as well.  With respect to post-9/11 counterterrorism 
statutes, the executive branch internally developed preferences, described 
the capabilities it wanted Congress to approve, and drafted desired 
legislation.234  Congress tinkered around the edges, but the substance of the 
legislation has reflected these executive preferences.235  Indeed, in the face 
of the public statements executive officials are willing to make, a legislator 
will be hard-pressed to refuse to give the President the powers he claims to 
need to keep America safe. 
Statutes in many policy areas are heavily influenced—if not dictated—by 
well-organized interests that will benefit from the legislation.236  In the 
counterterrorism realm, the well-organized interest behind the legislation—
the statutes’ “beneficiary”—is the executive branch itself and, in particular, 
the intelligence community.  Some observers assert that the congressional 
intelligence oversight committees, rather than acting as a check on 
executive powers, have “degenerated into a mutual admiration society for 
secret agencies.”237  The legislature thus plays a much smaller role in 
monitoring, shaping, and constraining the implementation of 
counterterrorism policy than it plays in other areas of domestic risk 
regulation.  Instead, both Congress and the public expect Congress to defer 
to the executive branch’s stated counterterrorism needs. 
This, some might argue, is how democracy should work.  If Congress 
feels pressure to defer to the executive on security questions, it is because 
its members perceive a constituent preference for them to do so.  There are, 
however, at least two reasons to question this argument.  First, even if the 
initial post-crisis legislation appropriately reflects the citizenry’s preference, 
 
Leaders of the Senate (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs112th/
dni_ag_letter.pdf. 
 234. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 46, at 1153–55 (describing the Bush Administration’s 
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compromises included in the original USA PATRIOT Act). 
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 236. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479, 1518–20 (1987) (synthesizing in simplified form the transactional analysis of 
legislation originating in Mancur Olson’s seminal 1965 book, The Logic of Collective 
Action). 
 237. See Loch K. Johnson, “The Contemporary Presidency”:  Presidents, Lawmakers, 
and Spies:  Intelligence Accountability in the U.S., 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 828, 833 
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); Koh, supra note 193, at 1273–74 & n.79 
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when it comes time for renewal, circumstances are different.  It is 
impossible to know what sort of legislative preferences voters would 
express if they were able to assess fully the government’s implementation 
of counterterrorism legislation.  Second, the majority’s demand for 
continuation of the security measures may result from the fact that the 
majority itself bears fewer costs for the measures’ implementation than 
certain segments of the population.238  If Congress’s renewal decisions 
reflect this tyranny of the majority, perhaps it is not a result that should be 
hailed as an effective instance of democracy in action. 
This array of forces exerting pressure to extend sunsetting 
counterterrorism surveillance statutes have meant that they have been 
consistently and repeatedly reauthorized, and that sunsets have been unable 
to force the reasoned, informed reconsideration for which they were 
envisioned.  None of this is to say that all emergency measures last 
forever.239  But outright repeals tend to be rare, difficult to bring about, and 
frequently the result of external forces rather than sunsets. 
III.  THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM SUNSET PROVISIONS 
Civil libertarian legislators who champion sunsets as a means to protect 
civil liberties in the face of the emphasis on security acknowledge that 
“adding sunsets . . . only gets us so far.”240  Whatever else it might do, “a 
sunset is no substitute for substantive improvement.”241  So unless there is a 
meaningful possibility of substantive changes when appropriate, sunsets 
add little civil-libertarian value.  If, as the preceding discussion indicates, 
expiring counterterrorism legislation is overwhelmingly likely to be 
renewed regardless of its actual impact, the question becomes whether 
sunsets have costs that outweigh the small chance of benefits they 
 
 238. See COLE, supra note 213, at 17–21; SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 204–08 (noting 
the risk of imposing excessive restrictions on civil liberties “when an identifiable subgroup 
faces the burden”); JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS 33–39 (2010); 
Cole, supra note 207, at 1349 (stating that during emergencies, U.S. government officials 
often infringe on the liberties of the most vulnerable, “while reassuring the majority that 
their own rights are not being undermined”); Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency:  
Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 316 (2009) 
(giving examples of policies that disproportionately burden certain groups). 
 239. See DONOHUE, supra note 27, at 270 (noting some opposition to presidential policy); 
Cole, supra note 207, at 1353 (pointing out that it is not impossible to regain liberties once 
sacrificed in the name of emergency, but that “the road back is very often a long, slow, and 
grueling one”); Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 & 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1155, 1171–75 (2008) (discussing bipartisan resistance to some of the President’s 
emergency-power requests after 9/11); cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 213, at 611 
(acknowledging the possibility of a “weak,” and therefore not absolute, ratchet effect). 
 240. 151 CONG. REC. 28,226 (2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold); see also Letter from 
Caroline Fredrickson, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, ACLU, to Congress, Re:  Vote NO on 
the Conference Report on the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005, H.R. 3199 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-letter-congress-urging-no-vote-usa-patriot-
improvement-and-reauthorization-ac (“[S]ome in Congress [were] content to receive tardy 
and generic reports from the administration about these powers, despite the public outcry.”). 
 241. 151 CONG. REC. 28,460 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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represent.  Exploration of the impact of sunsets on the legislative process 
itself is necessary to assess these costs. 
As Part III.A explains, commentators agree that if post-crisis 
counterterrorism legislation is passed, its effect will be to increase the 
executive’s security powers.  Congress’s concern that this increase will 
prove too great drives the inclination to limit temporally any such 
legislation.  This is where sunsets’ paradox arises.   
Part III.B demonstrates that, in creating a temporal limit on legislation, 
sunsets lower the barriers to enactment.  This means that counterterrorism 
legislation is more likely to be enacted if it includes a sunset.  But because 
the temporal limitation will not lead to the subsequent correction of 
policymaking errors,242 the overall impact of counterterrorism sunsets is to 
enable long-term congressional overreaction.  Part III.B then explains why, 
despite their effects, legislators would still agree to vote for sunsets in 
counterterrorism legislation.  In fact, there are compelling reasons—some 
sincere and some strategic—that legislators may nonetheless want to 
include sunsets in counterterrorism bills. 
Finally, Part III.C argues that sunsets’ costs might be addressed in one of 
two ways.  Each requires both legislators and voters to recognize that 
sunsets alone will not, in fact, guarantee the legislative reassessment for 
which they are designed.  Consequently, civil libertarian legislators, their 
constituents, and like-minded interest groups should demand that Congress 
either eschew the use of sunsets in this context altogether or seek means to 
augment dramatically sunsets’ effectiveness. 
A.  The Security Emphasis 
In the wake of terrorist attacks, government tends to blame the 
inadequacies of existing law for the failure to prevent the attacks, justifying 
action to address perceived gaps.243  This process yields predictable effects:  
because it is compensating for perceived shortcomings in security policy, 
counterterrorism legislation will have a “security emphasis,” meaning that it 
will seek to augment the government’s capacity to provide security.244  At 
the same time, the perceived value of civil liberties relative to security 
measures will decline.245 
 
 242. See supra Part II. 
 243. See Howell, supra note 46, at 1148; Vermeule, supra note 239, at 1175, 1188 
(noting lawmakers consistently agree in the wake of a terrorist attack that the status quo is 
unacceptable). See generally Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code) (response to hijacking of the Achille Lauro); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.) (response to Oklahoma City bombing). 
 244. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 213, at 631 (stating that post-crisis changes 
in law will always augment security). 
 245. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 9, 31–41 (2006); SUNSTEIN, supra note 140, at 206 (arguing that 
cognitive bias and social influences lead to legislation that “unduly sacrifices liberty in the 
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This security emphasis will be exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the 
benefits of increased security—which will be widely shared—many 
burdens imposed by counterterrorism legislation will fall disproportionately 
on disfavored, powerless, or voiceless groups.246  The majority’s legislative 
preferences will not take the full costs into account—neither short costs nor 
potential long-term costs of the deterioration of the relationship between 
law enforcement and minority communities.  Recall that people primed to 
think about their own death exhibit more nationalistic tendencies, 
disapproval of those who do not share their religious and political beliefs, 
and increased aggression toward those who do not share their cultural 
worldview.247  Using a volunteer army, borrowing rather than taxing, and 
detention and surveillance practices focused on ethnic and religious 
minorities all ensure that most Americans sacrifice very little liberty due to 
the “war on terror.”248  On the other hand, when the Transportation Safety 
Administration announced plans to require full-body scanners in airports—
a counterterrorism measure that threatened the privacy of a broader swath 
of the population—opposition was more robust.249  In short, the majority 
will support more costly security measures if it does not expect to pay all of 
those costs itself. 
The conventional wisdom holds that, in times of national security crisis, 
this security emphasis causes the U.S. Government to overreact to threats 
and infringe unnecessarily—and perhaps unconstitutionally—on civil 
liberties.250  On this view, the Sedition Act of 1798, President Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus, the internment of Japanese-Americans, and 
FBI infiltration of peaceful political dissidents during the Vietnam era all 
 
name of security”); Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention 
Paradigm:  The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1413 & n.16 (2003) 
(describing “conventional wisdom” that “during times of crisis the balance between liberty 
and security shifts in favor of the latter”); Gross, supra note 139 (manuscript at 24–25) 
(contending that processes “seeking to balance the interests of liberty and security” will 
suffer from systemic flaws that “are going to be tilted in one direction—towards more 
security—rather than the other—more liberty”). 
 246. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 28, 2002), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/feb/28/the-threat-to-patriotism/; cf. 
Issacharoff, supra note 203, at 198, 206 (noting that decisions to engage in asymmetric 
warfare against nonstate actors, particularly ones with a racial or ethnic component, are less 
susceptible to democratic political checks than decisions to engage in traditional interstate 
warfare). 
 249. See Nate Silver, The Full-Body Backlash, N.Y. TIMES FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 15, 
2010, 7:32 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/the-full-body-
backlash/. 
 250. E.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:  POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 58–61 (2004); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 530–31 (2004); Bruce 
Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029–30 (2004); Gersen, 
supra note 26, at 269–70 (predicting congressional overreaction to risks that are new, subject 
to uncertainty, or vulnerable to cognitive bias); Gross, supra note 139 (manuscript at 24–25); 
Ip, supra note 26 (manuscript at 9–14) (same). But see Mark Tushnet, Defending 
Korematsu?  Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003) 
(critiquing and refining the overreaction thesis). 
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represent examples where, in response to a “unique challenge,” “the 
[country] went too far in sacrificing civil liberties.”251  Many members of 
Congress subscribe to this theory as well;252 indeed, it is one of their 
primary motivations for the use of sunsets.253 
This position is not, however, universally shared.  Professors Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule dispute the “overreaction thesis.”254  In an argument 
that has been hotly contested,255 they argue that it is impossible to 
determine whether additional security measures enacted in the wake of a 
crisis are overreactions to the threat, or simply rational responses to 
shortcomings in the pre-crisis status quo.256  Further, they claim that 
excessive concerns about liberty are equally likely to impact the content of 
post-crisis legislation as excessive concerns about security.257 
This Article, however, need not come down on one side of this debate or 
the other.  It is irrelevant whether a new statute represents a correction to 
overly libertarian constraints, or an overreaction to the threat.  What is 
important here is the consensus with respect to the existence of the security 
emphasis—no one disputes that post-crisis counterterrorism legislation will 
always move, if at all, in the same direction:  toward additional security.  
The question there is not whether the law will move in the direction of 
additional security, but instead, how far it will move in that direction. 
B.  The Costs of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions 
Though it is impossible to specify the exact impact that a sunset will have 
on the substance of any given piece of legislation, arguments in favor of 
sunsets have failed to recognize the costs that sunsets impose on 
counterterrorism legislation.  According to legislative theorists, sunsets 
lower the cost of legislation.  Including a sunset reduces the stakes of 
passing that measure, because the law is perceived—either accurately or 
 
 251. E.g., STONE, supra note 250, at 12–14 & n.* (asserting that these “central lessons” 
about historical curtailment of Americans’ First Amendment rights “apply across the board” 
to civil liberties). 
 252. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 254. POSNER & VERMUELE, supra note 139, at 59–86. 
 255. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 207, at 1346–47 (stating that history indicates that the 
citizenry is much more likely to mobilize in favor of increased security than in favor of 
increased civil liberties); Gross, supra note 139 (manuscript at 7–16) (disputing Posner & 
Vermeule’s claim that excessive concern over civil liberties is just as likely as excessive 
concern over security); Marks, supra note 149, at 583 (noting that Posner & Vermeule’s 
“argument does not take adequate account of the magnitude and direction of individual 
cognitive and emotive responses” to terrorism). 
 256. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 139, at 51–66 (arguing that it is impossible to 
predict whether fear will prompt good or bad policymaking). 
 257. Id. at 59–86 (arguing that “libertarian panics” resulting in inadequate security 
measures are just as likely as “security panics” that result in excessive security measures); 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 213, at 627 (contending that individual behavior during 
emergencies is just as likely to overvalue civil liberties as it is to undervalue civil liberties); 
Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 872–79 (2005) (also arguing that 
libertarian panics are just as likely as security panics). 
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inaccurately—as temporary.258  Just as mechanisms that relieve Congress of 
the need to reach a clearly defined bargain, such as broad delegations of 
power or vague language, sunsets relieve legislators of the need to agree on 
specific long-term policy.259  Compromises are therefore easier to reach for 
legislation with a sunset than for long-term legislation. 
Lowering the barriers to post-crisis counterterrorism legislation in this 
way could have several possible effects.  One possibility is that legislators 
with concerns over the scope of security powers, assured that any 
problematic powers will be revisited and curtailed, might agree to vote in 
favor of a more expansive set of security measures than they otherwise 
would have approved.260  The resulting legislation would therefore include 
more or stronger security measures than legislation without a sunset would 
have contained.  A second possibility is that, by making it easier to 
legislate, sunsets allow Congress to enact a bill when, if required to agree 
on long-term legislation, it would not have legislated at all.  In either of 
these circumstances, sunsets increase the magnitude of the security 
emphasis in counterterrorism legislation, increase the likelihood that new 
security measures will be enacted, and thus increase the risk that a 
counterterrorism statute will represent an overreaction to the terrorist threat. 
The negotiations over the PATRIOT Act strongly suggest that including 
sunsets magnified that legislation’s security emphasis.  Recall that the 
House Judiciary Committee’s original bill failed to include several powers 
the executive requested, and that the White House was able to convince 
House leadership to bring to the floor a bill more akin to its preferences 
only after conceding that the bill would include a sunset.261  Phrased 
differently, the House agreed to vote on a bill substantively more to the 
Administration’s liking on the condition that it would be temporary 
legislation. 
Bargains over the PATRIOT Act sunsets also took place on a more 
granular level.  An example is the provision allowing Justice Department 
officials to share grand jury information with intelligence agencies.  The 
House Judiciary Committee’s bill required ex ante judicial review of 
 
 258. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 139, at 84 (“[K]nowledge that a given law 
contains a sunset proviso lowers the stakes of enacting it . . . .”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 529–32 (1992) (arguing that 
hold-outs are more likely to compromise on their preferences for temporary legislation than 
for long-term legislation). 
 259. Each of these tactics makes it easier to reach legislative agreement. See, e.g., John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91–111 
(2006) (describing textualists’ objections to reliance on legislative history to determine the 
terms of a legislative bargain, in part because it undermines the power conferred on political 
minorities by the Constitution’s intentionally onerous bicameralism and presentment 
requirements). 
 260. See Finn, supra note 26, at 502 (arguing that, at worst, sunsets make the adoption of 
counterterrorism legislation more likely); Gersen, supra note 26, at 261; Kysar, supra note 
23, at 1020 (noting an instance where including sunsets permitted Congress to enact “deeper 
tax cuts than would have been possible” in long-term legislation). But see Ip, supra note 26 
(manuscript at 25) (disagreeing). 
 261. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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disseminations of information gleaned from a grand jury within the 
executive branch.262  By contrast, the Senate’s USA Act required no 
judicial involvement at all.263  The final bill included ex post judicial review 
of information sharing, on the condition that the power would not sunset.264  
So the House was able to bargain away the sunset on that particular 
provision for more judicial involvement. 
If this is sunsets’ effect, they not only fail to mitigate concerns of 
excessive grants of power to the executive, but they actually exacerbate 
them.  Why then, would legislators agree to approve additional security 
measures in exchange for sunsets?  There are at least two possibilities.  
Legislators that insist on including sunsets for the sake of civil liberties may 
be sincere, or they may be strategic.265  Sincere legislators are simply 
mistaken (or overly optimistic) with respect to what sunsets actually will 
accomplish.  They may be unaware of the ways in which the 
counterterrorism policymaking environment works against sunsets’ 
effectiveness.  Or they may mistakenly believe that exploiting the leverage 
over the executive that a sunset provides will result in effective oversight 
despite the pressures to extend sunsetting counterterrorism legislation.  Or 
they may not realize sunsets’ potential impact on the substance of the 
underlying legislation and therefore view them as, in essence, “better than 
nothing.”  Or they may believe that the minimal benefits that sunsets can 
provide exceed their costs. 
The possibility of strategic legislators, on the other hand, exposes a third 
possible effect of using sunsets and therefore lowering the cost of enacting 
counterterrorism legislation.  It is possible that legislators who argue for 
including sunsets in a bill would have voted for it even if the sunsets were 
not included.  In other words, the sunsets may have no impact on the 
content of the legislation at all.  But including a sunset enables legislators to 
describe a controversial bill as temporary.  This description promotes the 
perception that the policy choices under consideration will be scrutinized 
and revised in calmer times.  As a result, Congress need not accept full 
responsibility for the policies it enacts. 
Strategic legislators have good reason to pursue this path.  The electoral 
risks of refusing executive requests for counterterrorism powers are 
significant.  If an attack occurs, no legislator wants to be perceived as the 
one who denied the executive a power it claimed to need.  At the same time, 
if the legislation passes and an attack follows, Congress can defer blame to 
the executive, whose policies it merely approved. 
 
 262. See Howell, supra note 46, at 1182–83. 
 263. United and Strengthening America Act, S. 1510, 107th Cong. § 203 (2001). 
 264. PATRIOT Act § 203, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). See generally 147 CONG. REC. 20,671 (2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 265. Executive branch officials also might resist sunsets for either sincere or strategic 
reasons (or both).  They likely are sincere in their desire to provide some certainty to 
executive-branch agencies.  For the purposes of legislative negotiation, it also behooves the 
President to resist sunsets when legislators want them. 
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Meanwhile, legislators can derive scant electoral rewards from 
associating themselves with particular counterterrorism policy, especially in 
contrast to legislation containing earmarks that provide congressional pork 
to their districts.  Since counterterrorism legislation provides small upside 
value and enormous downside risk, legislators are best served, electorally, 
by ensuring that any catastrophe cannot be laid at their feet through voting 
in (what is perceived as) a “pro-security” direction.266  This tendency is 
compounded by the fact that a large number of counterterrorism measures 
disproportionately impact segments of society—minorities or noncitizens—
whose electoral clout is insufficient to press for more moderate policy.267 
At the same time, there are limits to the infringement on civil liberties 
that Americans will support in the name of security, though exactly where 
those limits lie is difficult to discern.268  Knowing that constituents value 
both security and civil liberties, a legislator can use sunsets as a means to 
“position-take” with respect to civil liberties, publicly championing civil-
liberties-protecting positions without having to commit to any particular 
substantive policy.269  Confident in the notion that the sunset allows her to 
 
 266. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:  THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/11, at 91–92 (2012) (asserting that members of Congress “tend not to like 
responsibility for national security decisions”); IGNATIEFF, supra note 250, at 58 (noting that 
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overreaction”); ZEGART, supra note 195, at 35–36 (“What member would be willing to risk 
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jeopardizing American national security interests?”). See generally DONOHUE, supra note 27, 
at 12 (noting that in both the United States and Britain, legislators lacking full information 
about the nature and scope of the threat, will “err on the side of caution”); R. Kent Weaver, 
The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 372 (1986) (positing that legislators 
are most interested in minimizing blame for bad policy outcomes). 
 267. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 483, 495–96 (2010) (noting that survey respondents’ replies “produce mixed 
results depending on what is emphasized within the question” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Prior to the first PATRIOT Act reauthorization, Americans were unfamiliar with 
the content of the statute and a plurality believed that the Act was “about right” in its 
restrictions of civil liberties to fight terrorism. Lydia Saad, Americans Generally 
Comfortable with Patriot Act, GALLUP (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/10858/americans-generally-comfortable-patriot-act.aspx (finding that 43 percent 
thought it was “about right,” 26 percent believed it went “too far,” and 21 percent thought it 
did not go “far enough”).  In the wake of the initial PATRIOT Act reauthorization debates, 
familiarity with the statute had increased significantly, and 81 percent of individuals polled 
supported making at least minor changes to the statute. Civil Liberties, GALLUP (Jan. 6–8, 
2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/5263/Civil-Liberties.aspx (finding that 50 percent 
favored minor changes, 24 percent favored major changes, and 7 percent wanted to eliminate 
the statute completely).  Nearly three-fourths of the population opposed sneak-and-peek 
searches of Americans’ homes; a majority also opposed requiring certain businesses—
hospitals, libraries, bookstores—to provide records to terrorism investigators. Saad, supra 
(finding that 71 percent of Americans opposed sneak-and-peek searches, and 51 percent 
opposed business records orders providing access to some sensitive records). 
 269. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:  THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13, 39, 49–77 (2d 
ed. 2004) (arguing that legislators are primarily reelection seekers and use three activities to 
that end—”advertising,” “credit-claiming,” and “position-taking”—rather than pursuing 
particular policy outcomes). See generally id. at 114 n.68 (positing that the electoral process 
does not guarantee that legislators will be faithful agents of their constituents, “but only that 
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both defer to presidential security policy and assure her constituents that the 
bill preserves the opportunity for subsequent debate and revision, a 
legislator can reap the electoral benefits of both helping to protect the nation 
from terrorists and assuring protection of civil liberties.  The same “yes” 
vote can be depicted as both pro–civil liberties and pro-security.  Indeed, on 
this view, the more (and perhaps the shorter) sunset provisions in 
counterterrorism legislation the better, as each renewal vote can be 
exploited for these benefits. 
This may seem a cynical depiction of Congress’s stated concern for civil 
liberties.  But many congressional efforts at overseeing national security 
policy in the past half century display the same characteristics.  Congress 
has enacted an assortment of statutes over the past forty years purportedly 
imposing restraints on executive national-security power, including the use 
of military force, covert actions, foreign-intelligence collection, and 
detainee treatment.270 
But like sunsets, these measures have tended to impose procedural 
requirements rather than substantive limits, and as a rule they lack teeth.271  
Recent military activities in Libya illustrate the point.  The War Powers 
Resolution (WPR) limits the president’s authority to deploy U.S. military 
into “hostilities” beyond 60 days without congressional approval.  But the 
Obama Administration argued that, because “U.S. operations do not 
 
politicians will make it appear” as if they are); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 235, at 1643 
(“Discussion on the legislative floor, if it even occurs, is carefully orchestrated posturing for 
public consumption, while the real work goes on behind closed doors . . . .”). 
 270. Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 Title V, Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2006)) (requiring intelligence agencies to inform 
Congress about covert activities); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85c (2006)); Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment § 32, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 
22 U.S.C.) (requiring a presidential finding of a national security necessity for covert 
operations); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 55 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1541–1548 (2006)) (requiring congressional notification when troops are 
introduced into hostilities and limiting unilateral executive deployment to sixty days); see 
also, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) § 1403, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) 
(limiting the Defense Department’s interrogation methods); International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 162 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1701–1707 (2006)) (providing for congressional oversight of emergency economic powers); 
Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (requiring congressional approval of certain arms sales). 
 271. See, e.g., L. BRITT SNYDER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, SHARING SECRETS 
WITH LAWMAKERS:  CONGRESS AS A USER OF INTELLIGENCE (1997), available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol41no5/pdf/v41i5a
02p.pdf (detailing the evolution of congressional relations with the intelligence community 
from 1947 to 1994); ZEGART, supra note 193, at 20–32 (recounting the history of sporadic 
oversight efforts); Johnson, supra note 236, at 829–35 (noting that, since 1975, intelligence 
oversight “has been largely a story of discontinuous motivation and ad hoc responses to 
scandals”); Koh, supra note 192, at 1297–1301 (describing the shortcomings of 
congressional efforts to constrain executive action and increase congressional participation 
in foreign affairs policymaking); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of 
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1412–18 (1989) (pointing out that both the executive and 
Congress have disregarded reporting and oversight requirements in multiple statutes). 
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involve” ground troops, “sustained fighting[,] or active exchanges of fire 
with hostile forces,” they do not qualify as “hostilities” and thus fall outside 
the WPR’s ambit.272  If oversight of such visible and consequential national 
security activity as the use of U.S. military force abroad does not inspire 
stringent congressional engagement, it is not likely that secret 
counterterrorism measures will do so.  In short, if the sunsets in post-9/11 
counterterrorism statutes are more symbolic than substantial as a national 
security oversight tool, they are by no means unique.273 
There is some evidence that one can marshal to support a theory that 
members of Congress are driven, at least in part, by these strategic 
concerns.  Consider in this light Congress’s penchant for demanding 
information unlikely to contribute to meaningful reconsideration of 
counterterrorism policy, such as the number of times a particular tool has 
been used.  If it truly wanted to take advantage of the opportunity sunsets 
provide to rethink hastily drafted legislation, surely Congress could demand 
information assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of counterterrorism 
measures, rather than simply whether and how often they were being used. 
Compare, for example, the annual report about use of the federal 
domestic wiretapping law with the one about use of the FISA Amendments 
Act.  The former breaks down the numbers in a multitude of ways, 
identifying the purposes for which surveillance was used; whether it 
resulted in any arrests, trials, or convictions; the frequency and nature of 
nonincriminating communications; and the cost of the surveillance in 
manpower and resources.274  These numbers permit inferences regarding 
the scope, nature, and effectiveness of the surveillance employed.  By 
contrast, the Attorney General’s FISA Amendments Act reports provide no 
comparable information.275  As students of intelligence oversight have 
noted time and again, Congress knows what it wants to know.276 
Additionally, both in the PATRIOT Act’s original enactment and in its 
reauthorization, Congress failed to impose sunsets on many of the 
PATRIOT Act’s most intrusive powers, as well as those that had arguably 
been abused.277  This failure is consistent with the argument that legislators 
were more concerned with being able to point to the sunsets’ existence, 
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rather than actually relying on their effectiveness.  At least one 
organization—one with strategic goals of its own, to be sure—described the 
2005 PATRIOT reauthorization statutes as “designed to facilitate a talking 
point that civil liberties will be protected, when in fact, they are 
sacrificed.”278  Civil libertarian legislators echoed this assessment.279 
Moreover, legislators publicly point to their insistence on sunsets as a 
way to tout their civil libertarian bona fides—explicitly pointing to the civil 
liberties protection of a sunset in the statute and “position-taking” regarding 
the need for such measures.280  Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Patrick Leahy’s website, for example, declares that the Senator “has 
strongly supported the inclusion of sunsets on authorities authorized by the 
USA PATRIOT Act to provide more accountability and oversight.”281  And 
in 2005 Senator Ron Wyden announced his intention to oppose renewal of 
the PATRIOT Act “because it does not include sunsets for controversial 
powers.”282  If sunsets’ value is merely symbolic, then their value benefits 
legislators’ electoral prospects, but not their individual constituents or the 
nation as a whole. 
C.  Beyond Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions? 
If sunsets were costless, there would be no objection to including them 
despite their limited usefulness.  But rather than being costless, they render 
legislation already prone to excessive emphasis on security likely to move 
even further in that direction.  In addition, they obfuscate the true contents 
of the legislative bargain that a counterterrorism statute represents.  While 
promising temporary action followed by careful oversight, they in fact 
simply deliver long-term law.  This deception, whether intentional or 
inadvertent, undermines the already attenuated democratic pedigree of 
secret executive counterterrorism programs.  The nominal benefits that 
sunsets do generate cannot outweigh these substantial costs.283 
 
 278. ACLU Letter, supra note 240. 
 279. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 16,991 (2005) (statement of Rep. Paul) (arguing that the 
PATRIOT Act reauthorization bills failed to cure the Act’s defects and lamenting that much 
of the reauthorization discussion was focused on the length of the sunsets). 
 280. If the constituencies of legislators most adamant about including sunsets exhibit 
heterogeneity with respect to national security policy preferences, that would provide 
additional support for this theory. 
 281. National Security, PATRICK LEAHY, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/issues_and_
legislation/issues/issue/?id=c1620637-cf46-4298-a667-5eb724c7ef46&p=ae62594e-4cdd-
4988-a093-6095e848506a (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 282. Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden to Oppose PATRIOT Act Renewal (Dec. 5, 
2005), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=2AEAC483-F0AD-
41C7-B9AF-B771CD5ECE34. 
 283. Nominal benefits of sunsets include the fact that they provide a focus around which 
political pressure for change can be mobilized, likely deter executive branch wrongdoing by 
officials who know they will have to seek congressional renewal of their powers, and reverse 
the legislative default rules so that renewal of the legislation—rather than its repeal—must 
overcome congressional vetogates and the filibuster. 
 1830 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
If sunsets are not merely ineffective but counterproductive, the question 
then becomes what to do.  An indictment of sunsets does nothing to 
alleviate concerns about conferring excessive security power on the 
executive in the wake of a terrorist attack.  The best option is for civil-
libertarian legislators, voters, and interest groups to insist that Congress 
eschew the use of sunsets in counterterrorism legislation altogether.  First 
and foremost, legislators could then use their bargaining power to press for 
substantive civil-liberties-enhancing changes to the legislation, rather than 
for a sunset.  Abandoning sunsets may thus result in counterterrorism 
legislation less likely to overemphasize security. 
Second, eliminating sunsets will make the content of counterterrorism 
legislation more transparent, allowing an honest appraisal of the true terms 
of the bargain that the legislation represents.  Existing counterterrorism 
legislation ascribes to sunsets a benefit—future reassessment of the 
statute—that they do not confer.  A candid assessment of the law must 
include acknowledgment that the powers it enacts will be in place for the 
long term.  It is impossible for either legislators or their constituents to 
evaluate the true merits of legislation in the absence of this clarity.  Debate 
can then take place over the actual content of the bill. 
Some may argue that requiring a long-term bargain at the outset will lead 
to more draconian legislation.  After all, this argument goes, if a sunset 
lowers the barriers to compromise, it does so for all legislators, not just the 
ones who are wary of certain provisions in the bill.  And if the President 
and hawkish legislators see the initial enactment as their only opportunity to 
increase government counterterrorism powers, what is to stop them from 
exploiting the crisis atmosphere to confer on the executive at least as much 
power as is contained in the version of the statute with sunset provisions—
but this time explicitly for the long-term? 
To be sure, it is impossible to predict with certainty what bargains might 
be struck.  But this argument overlooks the legislative dynamics at work.  If 
legislators concerned about particular executive powers insist on imposing 
sunsets, it means that the sunsets are providing some value for those 
legislators.  Those who favor sunsets and those who do not tend to oppose 
one another regarding the substantive content of the bill as well.  It is 
unlikely that a bargain between these two interests would be more favorable 
to one side on both counts—both sunset and substance.  If the PATRIOT 
Act negotiations are any indication, removing sunsets will reduce, not 
increase, the security emphasis. 
Nor does forcing Congress to make a long-term bargain eliminate the 
possibility of future adjustments to the legislation.  Congress can (of 
course) change any law at any time.284  There are many forces that generate 
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congressional interest in reforming counterterrorism policies.  Investigative 
journalism, investigations by inspectors general, and litigation challenging 
executive policies all have resulted in refinements to counterterrorism law.  
Notably, recall that neither NSLs nor sneak-and-peek searches were subject 
to sunsets, yet they both came under serious congressional scrutiny.  And if 
these provisions garnered attention only because the PATRIOT Act sunset 
placed counterterrorism as a whole on the legislative agenda, consider that 
Congress must repeatedly pass both authorization and appropriations bills 
for intelligence community activities.  If some legislative leverage is useful 
in seeking information, or creating an ex ante deterrent to executive 
misdeeds, Congress can use those bills for that purpose.  In short, external 
forces create political will to act.  Whether that political will, once 
generated, will result in changes does not depend upon whether the 
provision at issue is subject to a sunset.  Thus civil libertarians do not lose 
anything by eliminating sunset provisions. 
An additional benefit of eliminating sunsets is it will help demarcate the 
line between two conceptually distinct but often conflated elements of the 
debate over the civil liberties impact of executive counterterrorism power.  
The first element is whether the substantive authority contained in the 
legislation confers too much power on the executive.  The second, and 
much more vexing, element of this debate is the question of how to secure 
proper oversight of policy implementation.  In its use of sunsets, Congress 
has blurred the line between these two issues, pointing to sunsets as a 
remedy for questionable policy substance.  Divorcing these two 
considerations will renew focus on determining what powers should be 
conferred upon the executive to facilitate its efforts to keep Americans safe 
and how to supervise their use. 
An alternative response to sunsets’ effects would be to not eliminate their 
use altogether, but instead to augment their effectiveness by using them in 
combination with additional means of enhancing their utility.  Professor 
John Ip advocates, for example, pairing sunsets with reporting requirements 
and other accountability measures.285  And Professor Bruce Ackerman has 
suggested that renewal of statutory security powers should require the 
approval of ever-increasing supermajorities.286  Arguably, each of these 
suggestions has the benefit of raising the cost of renewing expiring 
legislation.  Maintaining status quo would no longer be the path of least 
resistance, but instead reflect an affirmative legislative decision. 
These “sunsets plus” suggestions recognize sunsets’ shortcomings as 
standalone measures.  And they certainly would be an improvement over 
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the use of sunsets alone.  But they, too, are susceptible to the forces that 
undermine sunsets’ effectiveness.  If current congressional efforts to obtain 
information are insufficient, adding additional reporting requirements to 
counterterrorism statutes is unlikely to have a discernible impact.  The 
information will still be classified and only narrowly disseminated.  The 
executive will retain the same ability to delay, to disclose selectively, and to 
present information in ways that support its policy preferences.  And 
Congress will still be subject to the incentives that have plagued 
congressional oversight of national security since the enterprise began.  
Without strong congressional will to extract this information—will that has 
been largely absent to date—supplemental accountability mechanisms 
cannot save sunsets. 
And while escalating supermajority requirements may lead to more 
frequent termination of emergency powers, the point of a sunset is not to 
discontinue powers.  The point is to improve the statute over time, to enable 
Congress to incorporate lessons learned through experience with the policy, 
and to eliminate inefficacious or excessively costly measures.  Requiring a 
supermajority provides no guarantee that Congress will scrutinize 
counterterrorism policy in this way.  Moreover, serious questions remain as 
to whether Congress could impose supermajority requirements on future 
legislatures without a constitutional amendment.287 
A final weakness of proposed efforts to boost sunsets’ effectiveness is 
that Congress is always free to dispense with them down the road but leave 
in place the executive powers they were meant to check.  There is nothing 
stopping Congress from similarly repealing—or sunsetting—any 
supermajority or reporting requirement it attaches to a counterterrorism 
sunset.  Consequently, any effort to “fix” sunsets’ appears unlikely to 
remedy their shortcomings. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has consistently turned to sunsets to alleviate concerns about 
legislative overreaction to the threat of terrorism.  But sunsets do not help 
combat overreaction.  Instead, forces at work in the counterterrorism 
policymaking environment undermine sunsets’ aim of ensuring that 
counterterrorism measures will be subject to meaningful scrutiny in a 
noncrisis atmosphere.  But the impact of sunsets does not end there.  They 
also facilitate the passage of legislation with a magnified emphasis on 
security by lowering the costs of legislating.  Sunsets thus impose costs—
making it easier to enact legislation that overreacts to the threat of 
terrorism—without providing sufficient benefits. 
Sunsets’ failure to fulfill their promise presents a daunting challenge for 
which this Article has no satisfying answer.  The risk of overreaction that 
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sunsets are designed to mitigate remains real.  Yet sunsets as currently 
employed are not the means through which to address this risk.  Indeed, no 
democratic electorate should accept without further examination 
congressional assurances of civil liberties’ protections on the basis of 
sunsets.  Sunsets must either be coupled with robust mechanisms that 
increase the costs of counterterrorism legislation or, even better, abandoned 
altogether. 
